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JUVENILE SENTENCING: EFFECTS OF 
RECENT PUNITIVE SENTENCING 
LEGISLATION ON JUVENILE 
OFFENDERS AND A PROPOSAL FOR 
SENTENCING IN THE JUVENILE COURT 
CATHIJ. HUNT* 
Recent headlines reminiscent of a video store horror movie sug-
gest a nation filled with murderous children.! Despite extensive media 
coverage of "schoolhouse shooting sprees,"2 including five shootings 
on school grounds between February 1997 and June 1998, and the 
April 1999 Littleton, Colorado shootings,3 the actual amount of violent 
juvenile offending remains smal1.4 However, this small amount ofjuve-
* Book Review Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE, THIRD WORLD LAw JOURNAL. 
1 See, e.g., Lisa Popyk, Luke's Tormented World: The Kid Next Door Turned Killer, CINCINNATI 
POST, Nov. 9, 1998, at lA; Jim Adams, 4 Sclwols, 5 Shooters, 59 Victims; School Shooters Sent 
Numerous Warnings, COURIER']. (Ky.), Dec. 6,1998, at 4A;James Barron & Minday Sink, Laughing 
Gunmen Massacre Students: The Scene-School Choir Huddled in a Closet While the Invaders Blasted 
Away, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto, Can.), Apr. 21,1999, atAl; Steve Fainaru, Alaska Sclwol Murders: 
A Window on Teen Rage, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 18, 1998, at AI; Lisa Popyk, Teen Lives Out 
Murderous Dream, CINCINNATI POST, Nov. 10, 1998, at lA; Lisa Popyk, Violence is Seductive to New 
Breed of Killers, CINCINNATI POST, Nov. 9,1998, at lA; Lisa Popyk, Blood in the School Yard· Part 
1 of 4-Part Series: A Young Buy Explodes and Turns a Classroom into a Killing Ground, CINCINNATI 
POST, Nov. 7, 1998, at lA. 
2 See Adams, supra note 1. 
S Six youths between the ages of 11 and 16 committed the school shootings in the 16 month 
period between February 1997 and June 1998. In February 1997, 16-year-old Evan Ramsey killed 
his high school principal and a student, and wounded two other students in Bethel, Alaska. In 
October 1997, 16-year-old Luke Woodham killed his mother and two students, and wounded 
seven other students in Pearl, Mississippi. In December 1997, 14-year-old Michael Carneal shot 
and killed three students and wounded five others at his Paducah, Kentucky high school. In 
March 1998, 13-year-old Mitchell Johnson and ll-year-old Andrew Golden killed a teacher and 
four students, and wounded a second teacher and nine other students in Jonesboro, Arkansas. 
In May 1998, 15-year-old Kip Kinkel killed his parents and two students, and wounded 25 others 
at his Springfield, Oregon high school. See J.R. Moehringer, Both Guilty in Jonesboro Shootings, 
LA TIMES, Aug. 12, 1998, at A2; Lisa Popyk, Schoolyard Killers: Blood in the School Yard - Part 1 
of4-Part Series, CINCINNATI POST, Nov. 7, 1998, at 6A; see also sources cited in note 1. Most recently, 
in April 1999, IB-year-old Eric Harris and 17-year-old Dylan Klebold killed 12 students, one 
teacher, and themselves in their Littleton, Colorado high school-more than 20 others were 
reported seriously wounded. See Tom Kenworthy, Up to 25 Die in Colorado School Slwoting; Two 
Student Gun-men are Found Dead, WASH. POST, Apr. 21, 1999, at AI; Sam Howe Verhovek, 15 
Bodies Removed from School in Colorado, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1999, at AI. 
4 See infra notes 15, 61. 
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nile-initiated violence combined with a great amount of public atten-
tion has recently yielded more severe punishments for young offend-
ers.5 
Public perceptions of increasing violent crime rates6 have resulted 
in a flurry of federal and state legislative activity in the last decade. 7 
Punitive trends in the criminal justice system have significantly altered 
the structure of adult sentencing.8 These changes include the adoption 
of sentencing guidelines, mandatory minimum sentences, and sen-
tence enhancement provisions.9 
Changes to laws affecting juvenile offenders reflect these punitive 
sentencing approaches.1O Recent legislation has increased the number 
of offenses for which youths may be transferred to criminal court for 
trial, reduced the maximum age of juvenile court jurisdiction, incor-
porated adult sentencing approaches into the juvenile justice system, 
and introduced blended sentencing and other extended jurisdiction 
schemes.11 
5 See infra Part II, notes 54-143 and accompanying text. 
6 See THE REAL WAR ON CRIME: THE REpORT OF THE NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMMIS-
SION 3 (Steven R. Danziger ed., Harper Perennial 1996) [hereinafter REAL WAR ON CRIME). 
7 See, e.g., Robert O. Dawson, The Third justice System: The New juvenile-Criminal System of 
Determinate Sentencingfur the Youthful Violent Offender in Texas, 19 ST. MARY'S LJ. 943, 949, 953 
(1988); Barry C. Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy: A Case of juvenile justice Law &farm, 79 
MINN. L. REv. 965, 966 (1995) [hereinafter Feld, A Case of Refarm); Shari Del Carlo, Comment, 
Oregcm Voters Get Tough onjuvenile Crime: One Strike and You Are Out!, 75 OR. L. REv. 1223, 1231 
(1996); Robert Heglin, Note, A Flurry of Recidivist Legislation Means: "Three Strikes and You're 
Out, "20]. LEGIS. 213, 213 (1994); Debqrah L. Mills, Note, United States v.johnson: Acknowledging 
the Shift in the juvenile Court System From Rehabilitation to Punishment, 45 DEPAUL L. REv. 903, 
932 (1996); Richard Lacayo, Lock 'Em UP! ... ; With Outraged Americans Saying that Crime is 
Their No. 1 Concern, Politicians are Again Talking Tough. But are They Making Sense., TIME, Feb. 
7, 1994, at 50. 
S See, e.g., Gary T. Lowenthal, Mandatory Sentencing Laws: Undermining the Effectiveness of 
Determinate Sentencing Refarm, 81 CAL. L. REv. 61, 61-63 (1993); Robert L. Misner, Recasting 
Prosecutorial Discretion, 86]. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 717, 756-58 (1996); Heglin, supra note 
7, at 213-14. 
9 See generaUy Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea fur Less 
Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 901 (1991); Orrin G. Hatch, The Role of Congress in Sentencing: 
The United States Sentencing Commission, Mandatory Minimum Sentences, and the Search fur a 
Certain and Effective Sentencing System, 28 WAKE FOKEST L. REv. 185 (1993); Lowenthal, supra 
note 8; Norval Morris, Preface to Symposium on a Decade of Sentencing Guidelines: Revisiting the 
Role of the Legislature, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 181 (1993). 
10 See JULIAN V. ROBERTS & LoRETTA]' STALANS, PUBLIC OPINION, CRIME, AND CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE 266 (1997); REAL WAR ON CRIME, supra note 6, at 132-33; Kim Brooks et al., Beyond In 
Re Gault: The Status of juvenile Defense in Kentucky, 5 Ky. CHILDREN'S RTS.]. 1, 1 (1997); Mills, 
supra note 7, at 932; Deborah Passarelli, Note, Department of Youth Services: Control Over Sentenc-
ing and Monitoring of juvenile Delinquents, 21 NEW ENG.]. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 575, 
595-96 (1996). 
II See jeffrey Fagan, Separating the Men from the Bays: The Comparative Advantage of juvenile 
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As a result of these legislative changes, juveniles today face more 
severe sanctions than at any time since the inception of the juvenile 
justice system nearly a century ago. 12 The current emphasis on punish-
ment and accountability diminishes the rehabilitative goals of the ju-
venile justice system and brings it closer in function to that of the adult 
criminal justice system. 13 Consequently, justification for a separate ju-
venile system begins to crumble. 
Members of the juvenile justice system and the public cannot 
permit this disintegration of the juvenile court because it is essential 
to the vast majority of young offenders, who are capable of rehabilita-
tion. 14 Public perceptions of violent juvenile crime have resulted in the 
Versus Criminal Court Sanctions on Recidivism Among Adolescent Felony Offenders, in SOURCEBOOK: 
SERIOUS, VIOLENT AND CHRONIC JUVENILE OFFENDERS 238, 243-44 (James C. Howell et al. eds., 
1995); Julianne P. Sheffer, Note, Serious and Habitual Juvenile Offender Statutes: Reconciling 
Punishment and Rehabilitation Within the Juvenile Justice System, 48 VAND. L. REv. 479, 491-92 
(1995); see generally Christine M. Blegen, Creating options for Dealing with Juvenile Offenders 
(Juvenile Crime Bill), 52]. Mo. B. 46 (1996); Feld, A Case of Reform, supra note 7; Eric]. Fritsch 
& Craig Hemmens, An Assessment of Legislative Approaches to the Problem of Serious Juvenile Crime: 
A Case Study of Texas 1973-1995, 23 AM.]. CRIM. L. 563 (1996); Del Carlo, supra note 7. 
12 See Barry C. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court; Youthfulness, Criminal Responsibility, and 
Sentencing Policy, 88]. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 68, 68 (1997) [hereinafter Feld, Abolish the 
Juvenile Court); Fritsch & Hemmens, supra note 11, at 566-69. The enactment of the Juvenile 
Court Act of 1899 created the first juvenile court in Cook County, Illinois, and founded the 
American juvenile justice system. See MICHAEL J. DALE ET AL., REPRESENTING THE CHILD CLIENT 
'![ 5.01 [4], (5-7) (1998); Carrie T. Hollister, The Impossible Predicament of Gina Grant, 44 UCLA 
L. REv. 913, 919-20 (1997); Beth Wilbourn, Note, Waiver of Juvenile Court jurisdiction: National 
Trends and the Inadequacy of the Texas Response, 23 AM.]. CRIM. L. 633, 635 (1996); see also Mills, 
supra note 7, at 905. The purpose of the juvenile court was to separate young offenders from 
adult criminals with the intent to treat or "cure" the youths of their delinquency. See DALE, supra 
at (5-8); Feld, Abolish the juvenile Court, supra at 71-72; Wilbourn, supra at 635. Adopting the 
role of a parent, the juvenile court sought to correct the behavior of its children through a 
rehabilitative approach. See id.; Hollister, supra at 919-20; see also Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 
541,554-55 (1966). In the following 25 years, states across the country created similar juvenile 
justice systems. See DALE, supra at (5-8); Hollister, supra at 920; Wilbourn, supra at 635. 
13 See Feld, A Case of Reform, supra note 7, at 966; Del Carlo, supra note 7, at 1227, 1249; 
Mills, supra note 7, at 935; Passarelli, supra note 10, at 596; Adam Pertman, States Racing to 
Prosecute Young Offenders as Adults, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 11, 1996, at AI; see also Doris Sue Wong, 
Harsher Juvenile justice Wins Day; Senate Chiefs Bid for Flexibility Fails, BOSTON GLOBE, June 13, 
1996, at B29 (reporting that William Leahy, head of the Massachusetts Committee for Public 
Counsel Services, believes that punitive Massachusetts legislation demonstrates a dramatic depar-
ture from the traditional principle that youths are more likely to be rehabilitated than are adults). 
14 See lisa A. Cintron, Comment, Rehabilitating the Juvenile Court System: Limiting Juvenile 
Transfers to Adult Criminal Court, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 1254, 1273-74 (1996); Pertman, supra note 
13. "By [enacting legislation permitting youths to be tried as adults], they [politicians in every 
state) are scrapping a century-old principle of US jurisprudence-that juveniles are so moldable 
that all but the rare exception can be rehabilitated-and replacing it with a system emphasizing 
punishment and public safety." See Pertman, supra note 13; see also REAL WAR ON CRIME, supra 
note 6, at 132. "[B)ecause gang killings, drive-by shootings, and high school arms buildups have 
624 BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19:621 
adoption of punitive sentencing approaches that effect an overly broad 
group of youths. 15 As Jim Miller of the Indiana Juvenile Justice Task 
Force cautions, "[l]et's not throw the baby out with the wash."16 
This Note recommends that state juvenile justice systems provide 
rehabilitative opportunities to youths rather than eject young offenders 
from the juvenile justice system because of their age or offense. Part I 
of this Note describes punitive sentencing legislation in the criminal 
justice system, focusing on mandatory minimum sentences, sentence 
enhancement provisions, and sentencing guidelines. Part II examines 
three sentencing schemes now prevalent in the juvenile justice system. 
Part III analyzes the problematic structural differences and inconsis-
tent goals of the criminal justice and juvenile justice system sentencing 
schemes. Part IV discusses the future effect this sentencing legislation 
will have on the juvenile justice system and juvenile offenders. Finally, 
Part V proposes a model juvenile court structure which uses a blended 
sentencing scheme to retain the rehabilitative goals of the juvenile 
justice system while recognizing the need to protect public safety. 
1. CURRENT PUNITIVE TRENDS IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SENTENCING 
LEGISLATION: MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCING, SENTENCE 
ENHANCEMENT, AND SENTENCING GUIDELINE LEGISLATION 
State and federal legislation enacted in the last few decades re-
flects the nation's increasingly punitive approach toward adult criminal 
offenders. The trend began in the 1970s, upon the release of the 
gained headlines nationwide, we have shaped our policies in response to them, even where there 
are not such severe problems .... Increasingly the juvenile justice system has focused on punish-
ing all offenders-violent and nonviolent alike-with harsh sentences .... " REAL WAR ON CRIME, 
supra note 6, at 132. 
15 See Helen Leiner,Juvenilejustice: Act Now!, 22 CHAMPION II, II Qun. 1998); Brooks et al., 
supra note 10, at I. "[O]nly about one-half of one percent (1%) [sic] of juveniles in the United 
States commit violent offenses .... " Brooks et al., supra note 10, at I. "95 percent of juvenile 
cases involve non-violent crimes. In fact, ... violent juvenile crime has declined for two years in 
a row. Nonetheless, the public is constantly bombarded with information about 'violent predatory 
juveniles' and the need to protect society from being ravaged by such individuals." Leiner, supra 
at II. See also ROBERTS & STALANS, supra note 10, at 268 (reporting that less than one-half of 
one percent of juveniles in the U.S. were arrested for violent offenses in 1992); Andrea Neal, 
Editorial, Adjustingjuvenilejustice, INDIANAPOLIS STAR,Jan. 12, 1995, atAI2. "[W]e must remem-
ber that headlines of teen-age murder remain the exception. Of 114 homicides in Indianapolis 
last year, only two were by juveniles under 16." Id. 
16 Neal, supra note 15. "Especially in these days of guideline and mandatory minimum 
sentencing, three-strikes-and-you're-Qut laws, and the rise of the death penalty, to dismiss kids in 
trouble as 'criminals' is literally to throw the baby out with the bathwater." Abbe Smith, They 
Dream of Growing Older: On Kids and Crime, 36 B.C. L. REv. 953, 990-91 (1995). 
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results of a national treatment program evaluation study. I? The re-
searcher conducting the study concluded that rehabilitation is ineffec-
tive at reducing offender recidivism rates. IS When the study's findings 
received widespread publicity, the public and its elected representatives 
concluded that rehabilitation was no longer an appropriate sentencing 
goal. 19 Subsequently, a trend of imposing more punitive sentences on 
adult offenders emerged.20 Current sentencing schemes focus less on 
rehabilitation than on retribution, incapacitation, and general deter-
rence.21 
A. Mandatory Minimum Sentencing 
Mandatory minimum sentences match a legislatively required, 
predetermined minimum sentence with a particular offense. 22 The 
minimum sentence is often severe, involving a lengthy period of incar-
ceration for the offender.23 The predetermined sentence is imposed 
17 See Robert Martinson, What Wmks? Questions and Answers About Prison &form, 36 PUB. 
INTEREST 22, 25 (1974). "With few and isolated exceptions, the rehabilitative efforts that have 
been reported so far have had no appreciable effect on recidivism." [d.; see also Robert Martinson, 
New Findings, New Views, A Note of Caution &garding Sentencing &form, 7 HOFSTRA L. REv. 243, 
253-54 (1979) [hereinafter Martinson, New Findings, New Views]. 
18 See Martinson, New Findings, New Views, supra note 17, at 253-54. 
19 See Fagan, supra note II, at 242. United States Senator Orrin Hatch reports that Congress 
scrutinized the criminal justice system for nearly 10 years before concluding in 1984 that a 
criminal justice system based on the rehabilitation model of punishment was outmoded. See 
Hatch, supra note 9, at 187; see also Lowenthal, supra note 8, at 104. To inspire public confidence 
and deter crime, Congress responded with the enactment of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. 
See Hatch, supra note 9, at 187-88. 
20 See Hatch, supra note 9, at 188. 
21 See id. Retribution serves to punish offenders in proportion to their moral culpability or 
blameworthiness for the harm they cause. See Heglin, supra note 7, at 217; Sheffer, supra note 
11, at 487. Incapacitation intends to protect the public by removing offenders from society and 
holding them in prison. See Heglin, supra note 7, at 218; Sheffer, supra note 11, at 486 n.29. 
General deterrence punishes offenders regardless of their culpability to send a warning to other 
offenders of the consequences of committing the same offense. See Heglin, supra note 7, at 218; 
Sheffer, supra note II, at 486 n.28. The goal of general deterrence is to cause other potential 
offenders to fear the punishment so that they will not commit the offense. See id. In contrast, 
rehabilitation can be viewed as placing some of the blame for the offense on society and this 
method aims to change the offender's behavior so that he/she may return to society unlikely to 
commit another offense. See MICHAEL MOORE, LAw AND PSYCHIATRY, 234 (1984); Sheffer, supra 
note I I, at 482. For further discussion on the concepts underlying retribution, deterrence, 
incapacitation, and rehabilitation see Heglin, supra note 7, at 217-19; Sheffer, supra note II, at 
481-87. 
22 See Philip Oliss, Comment, Mandatary Minimum Sentencing: Discretion, the Safety Valve, and 
the Sentencing Guidelines, 63 U. CIN. L. REv. 1851, 1851 (1995); Hatch, supra note 9, at 192-93. 
23 See Hatch, supra note 9, at 193-94; Lowenthal, supra note 8, at 62, 64, 86; Mathew Brelis, 
626 BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19:621 
regardless of any mitigating circumstances or offender characteristics 
(e.g., age, family relationships, employment status) which a judge 
might typically consider to reduce the severity of a sentence. 24 Judges 
may sometimes sentence a convicted offender more severely than the 
legislation demands, but may not give a sentence below that which is 
required. 25 
As with other current sentencing schemes, two primary goals 
underlie mandatory minimum sentencing legislation. The first goal is 
to deter others from committing delineated offenses by levying certain 
and severe punishment on those committing the offenses.26 The sec-
ond goal is to incapacitate offenders for a societally acceptable period 
of time.27 
The allure of these two goals has made mandatory minimum 
sentencing prevalent in both the state and federal sentencing schemes. 
By 1990, forty-six states had enacted mandatory minimum or sentence 
enhancement legislation.28 By 1993, over one hundred mandatory min-
imum sentence provisions appeared in sixty federal criminal statutes.29 
Mandatory minimum sentencing has been especially popular 
among legislatures attempting to reduce drug-related crime.3D In the 
1980s, as drug use and distribution increased, particularly with the 
popularity, accessibility, and low cost of crack cocaine, the federal 
government and many states responded with the creation of manda-
tory minimum sentences for drug offenses.31 For example, in Massa-
chusetts, during the early and mid-1990s, a conviction for selling 200 
A Big-time Bust: Finally, There is Hard Evidence that Mandatary Minimum Sentencing Clogs Prisons 
with First-Time Offenders, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 8, 1998, at D1. 
24 See Lowenthal, supra note 8, at 104, 121-22; Oliss, supra note 22, at 1853-54, 1856. 
25 See, e.g., Del Carlo, supra note 7, at 1231. However, some statutes permit judges to impose 
less severe sentences if the defendant provided "substantial assistance" to the prosecutor in 
arresting and convicting other offenders. See Oiiss, supra note 22, at 1854, 1856, 1864. 
26 See Hatch, supra note 9, at 192; Lowenthal, supra note 8, at 64, 67, 68. 
<J:l See Lowenthal, supra note 8, at 68. 
28 See id. at 64-65. 
29 See REAL WAR ON CRIME, supra note 6, at 25; Hatch, supra note 9, at 193. 
30 See REAL WAR ON CRIME, supra note 6, at 25; Brelis, supra note 23; Carey Goldberg, Study 
Casts Doubt an Wisdom of Mandatary Terms for Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1997, at A14; David B. 
Kopel, Sentencing Policies Endanger Public Safety: Criticism of Mandatory Sentences, USA TODAY, 
Nov. 1995, (Magazine) at 64; Dennis Cauchon, Review of Drug Sentences Ordered, USA TODAY, May 
5, 1993, at 3A. 
31 See id.; Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 6371, 102 Stat. 4181, 4370, 
approved Nov. 18, 1998; Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207, 
approved Oct. 27, 1986; Controlled Substances Penalties Amendment Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 
9~73, § 501, 98 Stat. 1837,2068, approved Oct. 12, 1984; Matt Grayson, Laying Doum the Law: 
Study Claims Mandatory Minimums Cost Maximum Dollars; Rand Curp. Survey an Drug Sentences, 
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grams of cocaine resulted in a mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen 
years in prison.32 A conviction for selling one-half an ounce of mari-
juana required imposition of a mandatory two year prison term.33 
These sentences were imposed without regard to mitigating factors. 34 
Furthermore, the statute provided no opportunity for parole or early 
release.35 
The Massachusetts Legislature adopted these mandatory mini-
mum sentences because they were viewed as effective deterrents and 
appropriate incapacitative sentences.36 As such, the Massachusetts man-
datory minimum sentencing scheme for drug offenses is illustrative of 
the legislative trend to get tough on offenders.37 
B. Sentence Enhancements 
The twin goals of general deterrence and incapacitation also drive 
sentence enhancement legislation. 38 Generally, enhancements add 
years to the length of a prison term by attaching an additional penalty 
to a prescribed sentence if particular circumstances are present.39 
For example, enhancement penalties often attach for possession 
or use of a gun in the commission of an offense, or for possessing guns 
or drugs in a specified area, such as a school zone.40 As frequent gun 
possession and use during the commission of crimes gained notoriety 
in the late 1980s, a public desire to increase the severity of punishment 
70 SPECTRUM:]' ST. GoV'T 2 Gun. 22, 1997);John P. O'Connell,Jr., Throwing Away the Key and 
State Money; Study Reveals Ineffectiveness of Mandatory Sentencing Policies, 68 SPECTRUM:]' ST. 
Gov'T 28 Gan. 1995); Lowenthal, supra note 8, at 61-62; Oliss, supra note 22, at 1853; Bruce 
Butterfield, A Judgment on Sentences: Some Judges Balk at Preset Penalties, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 
27, 1995, at Bl [hereinafter Butterfield, AJudgment on Sentences]. 
S2 See Bruce Butterfield, Casualties of the System: Massachusetts Prisons Filling with Nonviolent 
First-Time Offenders, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 26, 1995, at Bl [hereinafter Butterfield, Casualties of 
the System]. 
S3 See Bruce Butterfield & Dick Lehr, Small-Timers Get Hard Time: Some Major Dealers Evade 
Stiff Sentences Others Can't Escape, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 24, 1995, at B1. 
So! See id.; Butterfield, A Judgment on Sentences, supra note 31. 
S5 See Butterfield & Lehr, supra note 33. 
:l6 See Commonwealth v. Cowan, 422 Mass. 546, 549 (1996); Butterfield, Casualties of the 
System, supra note 32. 
37 See Brelis, supra note 23. 
38 See Lowenthal, supra note 8, at 67-68 & 67 n.26. 
39 See id. 
40 See Lowenthal, supra note 8, at 70-71 & 70-71 nn.37, 39; Timothy]. Moroney, Crimes; 
Gun-Free School Zone Act, 27 PAC. LJ. 555, 555-56 (1996). Other common legislative provisions 
include enhancement for repeat felony offenders, offenses committed against vulnerable victims, 
possession of specified large amounts of prohibited drugs, and offenses committed while released 
from custody awaiting trial for other offenses. See Lowenthal, supra note 8, at 70-71 nn.38, 40-41. 
628 BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORW LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19:621 
for perpetrators of crimes involving handguns also emerged. In re-
sponse, the federal government imposed sentence enhancements for 
use of a firearm during the commission of an offense.41 Another such 
enhancement is the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act 
of 1994 which created the new federal crime of possession of a hand-
gun byajuvenile.42 
Similarly, in an attempt to stop drug dealing and violence in 
schools, state legislatures, largely influenced by the increase in the 
number of young gang members during the late 1980s, passed school 
zone statutes.43 These statutes generally require a fixed additional pen-
alty for possession of a gun or drugs within 1000 feet of a school.44 
These sentence enhancement provisions ensure a more lengthy period 
of confinement for any offender whose act fits within the statutory 
requiremen ts. 45 
C. Sentencing Guidelines 
Sentencing guidelines dictate mandatory sentences for all enu-
merated criminal offenses based on the characteristics of the crime 
and limited offender characteristics.46 Judges, except in very unusual 
41 See Undetectable Firearms Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-649, § 2, 102 Stat. 3816, 3816-18, 
approved Nov. 10, 1988; Crime Control Act ofl990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 1702(b)(3), 104 Stat. 
4789, 4845, approved Nov. 29, 1990. 
42 See Mark Soler,JuvenileJustice in the Next Century: Programs qr Politics, 10 CRIM.JUST. 27, 
27 (1996). 
45 See People v. MA., 529 N.E.2d 492, 495 (Ill. 1988) (quoting comments by the sponsor of 
the 1985 Illinois school and public housing zone statute); Butterfield, A Judgment on Sentences, 
supra note 31. 
44 See, e.g., 705 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 405/5-4 (6)(a) , (7) (a) (West 1992 Be Supp. 1998); 
Moroney, supra note 40, at 555-56. In Massachusetts, violation of the state school zone statute 
adds two years of additional time as a sentence enhancement to the underlying drug offense 
sentence. See Goldberg, supra note 30; Butterfield, AJudgment on Sentences, sufrra note 31. 
45 See Goldberg, sufrra note 30; Butterfield, A Judgment on Sentences, sufrra note 31. 
46 See Alschuler, supra note 9, at 907-08; Mills, sufrra note 7, at 923. Under the federal 
sentencing guidelines, judges are discouraged or explicitly forbidden from considering many 
offender characteristics in sentencing. See Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Guideline Systems and Sentence 
Appeals: A Comparison o/Federal and State Expmences, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 1441, 1464 (1997). As 
Reitz notes, some of these characteristics include: 
defendant's age (including youth), education and vocational skills, mental and 
emotional conditions, physical condition or appearance (including physique), em-
ployment record, family ties and responsibilities, community ties, as well as military, 
civic, charitable, and public service, and other prior good works[,] ... the defen-
dant's drug or alcohol dependence or abuse ... , the defendant's "lack of guidance 
as a youth," and other "similar circumstances indicating a disadvantaged upbring-
ing." 
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circumstances, cannot impose a sentence more lenient or more severe 
than the narrowly specified sentence range outlined in the guide-
lines.47 
Similar to the increasingly common adoption of mandatory mini-
mum and sentence enhancement legislation, many state legislatures 
have adopted sentencing guidelines.48 While no state had sentencing 
guidelines in 1972, more than twenty state legislatures had enacted or 
were considering enacting sentencing guidelines by 1997.49 
In 1987, federal sentencing guidelines promulgated by the United 
States Sentencing Commission took effect.50 The federal sentencing 
guidelines structure consists of a 258 box grid which provides a narrow 
range within which a judge must sentence an offender based on the 
offender's offense and criminal history background.51 The maximum 
sentence for tach range is, at most, six months or twenty-five percent 
greater than the minimum sentence.52 A judge may consider some 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances to shift the sentencing range 
up or down.53 
Therefore, sentencing guidelines reflect general punitive sentenc-
ing trends by ensuring similar sentences for all offenders based almost 
exclusively on present offense and criminal history, without permitting 
consideration of offender personal characteristics which traditionally 
served to reduce sentence severity. As a result, offenders often serve 
lengthy prison terms, thus serving the legislation's general deterrence 
and incapacitation goals. 
Id. (quoting the federal sentencing guidelines). Judges previously considered many of these 
characteristics and qualities as mitigating factors when determining the appropriate sentence for 
a convicted offender. See id. 
47 See Alschuler, sufrra note 9, at 908. Only in the unlikely event a judge finds an aggravating 
or mitigating circumstance not adequately considered by the guidelines may he/she sentence 
above or below the specified sentencing range. See id. 
48 See Reitz, supra note 46, at 1442-43, 1447. Several states have used sentencing guidelines 
for many years. See id. at 1442-43. For example, Minnesota has had sentencing guidelines for 
eighteen years, Pennsylvania has had sentencing guidelines for sixteen years, Florida for fifteen 
years, Washington for fourteen years, and Oregon for nine years. See id.; see also Lowenthal, supra 
note 8, at 61-62. 
49 See Reitz, supra note 46, at 1447. 
50 See Hatch, supra note 9, at 190; Mills, supra note 7, at 922. The Sentencing Reform Act of 
1984 abolished parole and created the United States Sentencing Commission, empowering it to 
c~eate sentencing guidelines that Congress made compulsory. See Hatch, sufrra note 9, at 188-89. 
51 See Alschuler, supra note 9, at 907-08; Hatch, supra note 9, at 189. 
52 See Alschuler, sufrra note 9, at 908; Hatch, sUfrra note 9, at 189. The judge may increase 
the sentence severity up to six months or 25% more than the minimum required sentence, 
whichever yields the greatest increase in punishment. See Alschuler, sufrra note 9, at 908. 
5S See Alschuler, supra note 9, at 907. 
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Each of these three types of sentencing legislation is based on 
the public belief that rehabilitation is an ineffective response to crime 
and that a more punitive approach is necessary. All three sentencing 
schemes embody general deterrence and incapacitation punishment 
justifications. All three have increased the sentences of convicted adult 
offenders. 
II. CURRENT PUNITIVE TRENDS IN SENTENCING YOUNG OFFENDERS 
In this national punitive atmosphere, the public, politicians, state 
legislatures, and Congress have sought harsher penalties for juvenile 
offenders.54 Legislative purpose has shifted away from the rehabilitative 
"best interests of the child" standard, which bases sentencing on the 
offender's needs,55 to punishment and "accountability."56 Juvenile sen-
tences are now dictated according to the perceived need for the pro-
tection of public safety.57 Making policy decisions based on worst-case 
54 See DALE ETAL., sUfrranote 12,15.01 [5], (5-10),15.03 [12]' (5-54) (1997) (reporting 
that nearly all states have taken legislative or executive action to respond to reported increases 
in juvenile arrests for violent offenses and discussing the public belief of a violent juvenile crime 
wave); see also Feld, Abolish the juvenile Court, supra note 12, at 79 & n.22; Coordinating Council 
on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Combating Violence and Delinquency: The Na-
tional juvenile justice Action Plan (visited Mar. 19, 1997) <http://www.ncjrs.org/ 
txtfiles/jjplanfr.txt> [hereinafter Coordinating Council]; Robert B. Acton, Note, Gubernatorial 
Initiatives and Rhetoric of juvenilejustice Refurm, 5 J.L. & POL'y 277, 278-80 (1996); Mills, sUfrra 
note 7, at 911; Case Comment, Eighth Amendment-juvenile Sentencing-Ninth Circuit Upholds 
Life Sentence Without Possibility of Parole of Fifteen-Year-Old Murderer.-Harris v. Wright, 93 F.3d 
581 (9th CiT. 1996), 110 HARv. L. REv. 1185, 1185 (1997) [hereinafter Harvard Law Review Case 
Comment]. 
55 See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966); Feld, A Case of Refurm, SUfrra note 7, 
at 1083-84; Edmund V. Ludwig, Young in Years, Mature in Crime: A New System for Handling 
Violent Youthful Offenders in Pennsylvania, 17 PA. LAw. 16, 17-18 (1995); Alan]. Tompkins et aI., 
Subtle Discrimination in juvenile justice Decisionmaking: Social Scientific Perspectives and Explana-
tions, 29 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1619, 1629 (1996). Under this standard, youths are not punished 
through a sentence of a set length in a locked facility; rather, they receive services aimed to correct 
problematic behavior. See Feld, A Case of Refurm, supra note 7, at 1083-84. For example, these 
services often include remedial education, anger management, vocational training, and thera-
peutic counseling. See Jodie English, The Light Between Twilight and Dusk: Federal Criminal Law 
and the Volitional Insanity Defense, 40 HASTINGS LJ. I, 25 (1988); Eric K. Klein, Note, Dennis the 
Menace or Billy the Kid: An Analysis of the Role of Transfer of Criminal Court in juvenile justice, 35 
AM. CRIM. L. REv. 371, 403-04 (1998);Jennifer M. O'Connor & Lucinda K. Treat, Note, Getting 
Smart About Getting Tough: juvenile justice and the Possibility of Progressive Refurm, 33 AM. CRIM. 
L. REv. 1299, 1319 (1996); Sheffer, sUfrra note 11, at 507. 
56 SeeFeld, Abolish thejuvenile Court, supra note 12, at 71-72; Kathleen A. Baldi, The Denial 
of a State Constitutional Right to Bail in juvenile Proceedings: A Need for Reassessment in Washington 
State, 19 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 573, 589 (1996); Acton, supra note 54, at 329-32; Passarelli, supra 
note 10, at 595-600. 
57 See Acton, sUfrra note 54, at 330-32. In his survey of state political initiatives, Roben B. 
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scenarios,58 the frightening predictions of a few criminologists,59 me-
dia-induced fear,60 and some evidence of increased juvenile violence,61 
Acton observes that many governors have recommended changing the titles of state oversight 
departments and juvenile codes to reflect the recent legislative shifts in the focus of the states' 
juvenile justice systems. See id. at 330-31. Texas Governor George W. Bush changed the name of 
the state law "Delinquent Children & Children in Need of Supervision" to 'Juvenile Justice Code." 
See id. at 330. Virginia's Governor's Commission recommends changing the primary goal of its 
juvenile justice legislation from "welfare of the child" to protection of public safety and juvenile 
accountability. See id. at 330-31. Similarly, in legislation which took effect on October 1, 1996, 
Massachusetts created "an emergency law ... for immediate preservation of public safety," 
defining its purpose as "an improved system of juvenile justice" and "an act to provide for the 
prosecution of violent juvenile offenders in the criminal courts of the Commonwealth." See 
Youthful Offender Act, ch. 200, 1996 Mass. Legis. Servo 1, 1 (West). 
58 See Franklin E. Zimring, The Treatment of Hard Cases in AmencanJuvenileJustice: In Defense 
of Discretionary Waiver, 5 NOTRE DAME].L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'y 267, 274 (1991) [hereinafter 
Zimring, Defense of Discretionary Waiver] (stating that legislative decisions to expand juveniles' 
exposure to criminal court sentences are deliberately overbroad because the standards are created 
to provide for the worst case juvenile offenders in every category of offense); Reitz, supra note 
46, at 1445 n.19 (observing that legislatures consider the worst possible scenarios when creating 
statutory sentencing structures). 
59 See John]. DiIulio, Jr., Should Society Punish or Rescue Teen Predators, PLAIN DEALER 
(Cleveland, Ohio), Aug. 2, 1996, at liB; Susan Estrich, Counterpoints: 'Immunize' Kids Against 
Life of Crime, USA TODAY, May 9,1996, at 15A;John]. Dilulio, Jr. & Douglas Dillon, Fill Churches, 
Not Jails: Youth Crime and "Superpredators, " Congressional Testimony to the United States Senate 
on the Nature of Youth Violence by Federal Document Clearing House, Feb. 28, 1996 available 
in 1996 WL 7136302. Princeton University professor John]. Dilulio, Jr. predicts that in the next 
decade the United States violent juvenile crime rate will soar as a result of a dramatic increase 
in the number of remorseless violent young offenders he calls "superpredators." See id. But see 
Franklin E. Zimring, Crying Wolf over Teen Demons Crime: Projecting a NI!W Crime Wave Serves 
Politicians Well, Even if it Has No Basis in Reality, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 19,1996, at B5 [hereinafter 
Zimring, Crying Wolj] (arguing that Dilulio's statistics are inaccurately based solely on an increase 
in the juvenile population, and analogizing Dilulio's argument to that of the late 1940s and early 
1950s domestic scare about communists). 
60 See REAL WAR ON CRIME, supra note 6, at 64-65, 67, 69-73. 
61 See Blegen, supra note 11, at 46 (reporting a Justice Department study finding a 68% 
increase in juvenile court cases involving serious offenses including murder and aggravated 
assault between 1988 and 1992); Barry C. Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy: Minnesota Juvenile 
Justice Task Force and 1994 Legislative Reform, HENNEPIN LAw., Sept.-Oct. 1994, at 20, 20 [here-
inafter Feld, TaskForce) (reporting that juveniles committed a disproportionate amount ofviolent 
crime between 1980 and 1991); Acton, supra note 54, at 278-79 (reporting that the number of 
murders committed by youths 14 to 17 years of age increased 172% between 1985 and 1994); 
Mills, supra note 7, at 931-32 (reporting a 217% increase in arrests of youths 15 to 17 years of 
age on homicide charges from 1985 to 1991). But see Laureen D'Ambra, A Legal Response to 
Juvenile Crime: Why Waiver of Juvenile Offenders is Not a Panacea, 2 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 
277, 277 (1997) [hereinafter D'Ambra, Why Waiver is Not a Panacea] (reporting that violent 
juvenile crime decreased in 1995); Soler, supra note 42, at 931-32 (reporting that juvenile crime 
levels are at or below levels of 20 years ago). However, very few youths commit violent crimes. See 
REAL WAR ON CRIME, supra note 6, at 132 (reporting that rape and murder account for less than 
one-half of one percent of juvenile arrests and only six out of 100 juvenile arrests are for violent 
crimes whereas 13 out of 100 adult arrests are for violent crimes); Brooks et al., supra note 10, 
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state legislatures have created and amended legislation to expand 
sentencing possibilities for all young offenders.62 Recent punitive state 
legislative changes to the juvenile justice system appear in three prin-
cipal forms.63 First, by amending their laws to place a larger number 
of young offenders within the jurisdiction of adult criminal courts, 
many states have reduced the scope of the types of cases which the 
juvenile court may handle.64 Second, other states have expanded the 
sentencing power of the juvenile court, and permit juvenile court 
judges to use criminal justice system sanctions in sentencing young 
offenders.65 Finally, some states have altered the sentencing structure 
of the juvenile court so as to provide juvenile court judges with the 
at 1 (reporting that "only about one-half of one percent (1 %) [sic) of juveniles in the United 
States commit violent offenses"); Neal, supra note 15 (reporting that only two of the 114 homi-
cides in Indianapolis in 1994 were committed by juveniles under 16). The National Criminal 
Justice Commission observes that in 1992, U.S. juvenile courts handled more than one million 
"criminal" cases but only 2500 of these involved a youth charged with homicide. See REAL WAR 
ON CRIME, supra note 6, at 137. When the cases dismissed for lack of evidence are subtracted 
from this number, less than 1000 youths nationwide were convicted of killing someone in 1992. 
See id. Furthermore, whether violent juvenile crime has increased varies dramatically depending 
on the baseline from which it is measured. See Feld, A Case oj ReJarm, supra note 7, at 974. For 
example, comparing the present violent juvenile crime rate to rates in 1980 is likely to reveal only 
a moderate change, whereas comparing the present rate to the low 1985 violent juvenile crime 
rate will likely yield a dramatic increase. See id. 
62 See Coordinating Council, supra note 54 (reporting that 41 states have enacted legislation 
expanding the use of transfer mechanisms since 1978 and 13 states created or expanded statutory 
legislative transfer provisions in 1994); Robert E. Shepherd,Jr.,juvenilejustice, 12 CRIM.JUST. 45, 
45 (1997) (reporting that all but 10 states have expanded their ability to try youths as adults since 
1992, many reducing the age at which transfer can occur); Soler, supra note 42, at 27 (reporting 
that approximately half of the states in 1995 and 1996 made possible an incrliase in the number 
of youths tried as adults by: "(1) lowering the age of transfer, (2) increasihg the number of 
offenses for which youths may be transferred, (3) providing that for certain offenses there is a 
rebuttable presumption that the youths will be prosecuted in adult court (reverse waiver), or 
increasingly, (4) by simply giving prosecutors discretion to decide which youths to prosecute in 
adult court"). See generally Dale Parent et al., Key Legislative Issues in Criminaljustice: TransJerring 
Serious juvenile Offenders to Adult Courts (visited Mar. 19, 1997) <http://www.ncjrs.org/txtfiles/ 
trans. txt; Acton, supra note 54, at 287-90. 
63 See Feld, Task Force, supra note 61, at 22-23; Acton, supra note 54, at 287-98. A fourth 
approach, exhibited by legislation creating a third system of justice separate from the juvenile 
and criminal justice systems, is beyond the scope of this Note. States, such as California, which 
have implemented this approach, separate young offenders considered serious or violent from 
both adult and juvenile offender populations. See Feld, A Case oj ReJarm, supra note 7, at 1039; 
Ludwig, supra note 55, at 18. Often offenders up to the age of 25 can fall into this classification. 
See Feld, A Case oj ReJarm, supra note 7, at 1039. 
64 Se~ Fagan, supra note 11, at 239, 243; Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Preven-
tion, U.S. Department of Justice , State Responses to Serious and Violent juvenile Crime (visited Oct. 
19, 1997) <http://www.ncjrs.org/txtfiles/ 161665.txt> [hereinafter OlJDP). 
65 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1663(6)-(7) (Supp. 1997); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 119, 
§ 58 (a) (West Supp. 1998). 
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ability to impose suspended or conditional adult sentences on some 
youths.66 
A. Legislation Placing a Larger Number of Youths Within Adult 
Criminal Court Jurisdiction 
Many states recently have reduced the scope of the juvenile court 
in two ways. First, most states have increased the number of offenses 
for which youths may be transferred to criminal court for trial.67 Sec-
ond, several states have reduced the maximum age of juvenile court 
jurisdiction.68 Both types of changes have limited the number and type 
of cases the juvenile court may hear. 
1. Expansion of Transfer Provisions 
Transfer69 is the legislative mechanism which removes a youth 
from juvenile court jurisdiction, and shifts him/her to adult criminal 
court jurisdiction for trial and sentencing.70 Transfer represents a de-
cision that the more punitive sentences the adult criminal justice sys-
tem offers are necessary for the particular juvenile offender.71 
Community demands for public safety protection from violent 
juvenile offenders, coupled with a belief that the juvenile justice system 
66 See Fagan, supra note II, at 239, 243. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 119, § 58 (b) 
(West Supp. 1998); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.126(4) (West 1998); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.073 (West 
Supp. 1999); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-2-20 (Michie Supp. 1998). 
67 See Fagan, supra note 11, at 239, 243; OlJDP, supra note 64. Between 1992 and 1996, 24 
of the 36 states with legislative transfer provisions added offenses to be excluded from juvenile 
court jurisdiction. See OlJDP, supra note 64. In 1987, only 17 states and the District of Columbia 
had enacted legislative transfer provisions excluding from juvenile court jurisdiction youths 
charged with particular offenses or who had prior delinquency adjudications or convictions. See 
Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of the Offense: Legislative Changes in Juvenile 
Waiver Statutes, 78]. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 471, 512-13 (1987) [hereinafter Feld, Principle of 
the Offense). Fourteen of these states excluded specific offenses (most commonly serious felonies). 
See id. at 515. 
68 See Fagan, supra note 11, at 239, 243; OlJDP, supra note 64; see also Coordinating Council, 
supra note 54. 
69 Transfer is also called "waiver," "certification," and "remand" in some state legislation. See, 
e.g., Blegen, supra note 11, at 47-48; Laureen Q. D'Ambra, A Legal &sponse to Juvenile Crime: 
Waiver and Certification Statutes in Rhode Island, 45 R.I. B.]. 5, 29 (1997) [hereinafter D'Ambra, 
Waiver Statutes in Rhode IslantiJ; Feld, A Case ofRefurm, supra note 7, at 1006; Fritsch & Hemmens, 
supra note 11, at 570; Del Cario, supra note 7, at 1224, 1229, Mills, supra note 7, at 912. 
70 See Feld, Principle of the Offense, supra note 67, at 487-99; Fritsch & Hemmens, supra note 
11, at 570; Cintron, supra note 14, at 1261, 1267-68. 
71 See Feld, Principle of the Offense, supra note 67, at 488; Fritsch & Hemmens, supra note 11, 
at 570; see also Parent et aI., supra note 62; Leta R. Holden, Note, Tenth Circuit Survey: Juvenile 
Law, 73 DENV. U. L. REv. 843, 858 (1996); Mills, supra note 7, at 912-13. 
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cannot control these youths, is the primary motivation for expanding 
transfer legislation.72 Proponents argue that adult sanctions will keep 
young offenders locked up longer and will deter other youths from 
committing similar offenses for fear of receiving the same sentences.73 
All states allow some form of transfer. 74 Indicative of current pu-
nitive trends, between 1992 and 1996, all but ten states created or 
altered statutes to enable more juveniles to be tried in adult criminal 
courtS.75 Recent changes in transfer statutes primarily expand the list 
of offenses subjecting youths to transfer,76 and reduce the age at which 
a youth is subject to transfer.77 Many states have adopted acts requiring 
automatic transfer for enumerated offenses, especially those involving 
guns and drugs. 7s 
72 See ROBERTS & STALANS, supra note 10, at 271; REAL WAR ON CRIME, supra note 6, at 
135-36; Coordinating Council, supra note 54; Feld, Principle of the Offense, supra note 67, at 495, 
498; Fritsch & Hemmens, supra note 11, at 570; Parent et al., supra note 62; Acton, supra note 
54, at 331. An additional reason commonly provided as justification for transferring youths to 
criminal court jurisdiction is community vengeance. See Smith, A., supra note 16, at 1005-06; 
Holden, supra note 71, at 858 & n.l45. 
73 See Fagan, supra note II, at 238; Victor L. Streib, The Efficacy of Harsh Punishments for 
Teenage Violence, 31 VAL. U. L. REv. 427, 432 (1997); O'Connor & Treat, supra note 55, at 1313-14; 
cf. Sheffer, supra note II, at 500-01 (arguing that although adult sanctions are likely to incapaci-
tate young offenders for longer periods than juvenile court sanctions, it is not certain that they 
deter other youths). 
74 See RANDY HERTZ ET AL., 'I'RIAL MANUAL FOR DEFENSE ATTORNEYS IN JUVENILE COURT 
§ 13.01 (1991); OlJDP, supra note 64, at 14. 
75 See O]DP, supra note 64. 
76 For example, in its 1996 legislative session, California extended its list of transfer eligible 
offense charges from a total of 25 to 29 offenses. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707 (b) (West 
Supp. 1999); see also Acton, supra note 54, at 287-89; Soler, supra note 42, at 27. 
77 See Acton, supra note 54, at 285 n.30 (reporting that nine states currently permit transfer 
for youths aged 16 and older, five permit transfer at the age of 15, twenty states at the age of 14, 
six states at the age of 13, one at the age of 12, and two states permit transfer at the age of 10). 
See also Soler, supra note 42, at 27; Harvard Law Review Case Comment, supra note 54, at 1185 
& n.1. 
7B See, e.g., 705 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 405/5-4 (7)(a) (West 1992 & Supp. 1998). A total of 
40 states have enacted statutes aimed at deterring youths from carrying guns and other weapons 
to school. See Paul M. Bogos, Note, ''Expelled, No Excuses, No Exceptions"-Michigan's Zero-Toler-
ance Policy in Response to School Violence: M.C.L.A. Section 380.1311,74 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 
357, 371-72 (1997). These statutes prohibit possession of firearms on or near school grounds. 
See id; see also Gilbert E. Gregory, Juvenile & Domestic Legislation, J. KAN. B. AsS'N, Aug. 1994, 
32, 32 (reporting on Kansas Senate Bill 500 which creates the crime of possession of a handgun 
by a juvenile); Acton, supra note 54, at 308 (reporting that many recent gubernatorial reform 
proposals have focused on juvenile gun possession and target possession of weapons and drugs 
on or near school grounds); Johnnie B. Beer, Crimes; Guns-Gun-Free School Zone Act of 1995, 
26 PAC. LJ. 396, 396-97 (1995) (reporting on the enactment of the California Gun-Free School 
Zone Act of 1995 requiring imposition of a two to five year sentence on anyone convicted of 
possessing a firearm in a school zone); Susan L. Ludwigson, Note, Gun-Free School Zones, 19 SETON 
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For example, Illinois has enacted a school and public housing 
zone legislative transfer statute.79 This statute provides that the juvenile 
court has no jurisdiction over a youth aged fifteen or older who is 
charged with first degree murder, aggravated criminal sexual assault, 
armed robbery with a firearm, or possession of a weapon on school 
grounds.80 In addition, a youth aged fifteen or older who commits a 
violation of the Illinois Controlled Substance Act8! on school grounds, 
in a school vehicle, on public housing property, or on a public way 
within one thousand feet of a school or public housing property, is 
automatically transferred to adult criminal court jurisdiction.82 
2. Reduction of the Maximum Age Limit for Juvenile Court 
Jurisdiction 
Related to automatic transfer, a second state legislative punitive 
trend has been to reduce the maximum age of juvenile court jurisdic-
tion.83 In effect, this labels youths as adults for criminal prosecution 
and sentencing purposes.84 This legislation is motivated by the belief 
that offenders between the ages of sixteen and eighteen (the age at 
which juvenile court jurisdiction traditionally ended)85 are less child-
like now than they were at the turn of the century when the juvenile 
court was created.86 There is an assumption that youths of these ages 
"possess the cognitive and reasoning abilities that make them substan-
tially equivalent to adult criminal defendants."87 Thus, the argument 
follows, these youths should receive the same sentences as adults. 
HALL LEGIS.]. 921, 921-22 & 921 n.2 (1995) (discussing the New Jersey State Legislature's recent 
"flurry oflegislation" including a Gun-Free School Zone Act and Drug-Free School Zone Act). 
79 See 705· ILL. CaMP. STAT. ANN. 405/5-4 (6)-(7) (West 1992 & Supp. 1998). 
80 See 705 ILL. CaMP. STAT. ANN. 405/5-4 (6) (a) (West 1992 & Supp. 1998). The statute lists 
eligible weapons as switchblade knives, guns, and tasers. See id. 
81 720 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 570 (West 1993 & Supp. 1998). This criminal statute provides 
that it is unlawful to manufacture, deliver, or possess with intent to manufacture or deliver any 
controlled substance or look-alike controlled substance. See id. Furthermore, it is unlawful to be 
part of a calculated criminal drug conspiracy. See id. 
82 See 705 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 405/5-4 (7) (a) (West 1992 & Supp. 1998). 
83 See Fagan, supra note II, at 239; OlJDP, supra note 64. Between 1992 and 1996, six states 
lowered the maximum age of juvenile court jurisdiction. See id; see also Coordinating Council, 
supra note 54. 
84 See Fagan, supra note II, at 239; OlJDP, supra note 64. 
85 See Smith, A, supra note 16, at 953 n.2; Fritsch & Hemmens, supra note 11, at 598. 
86 See Baldi, supra note 56, at 591-92 & 591-92 nn.159-60; Smith, A., supra note 16, at 961. 
87 See Baldi, supra note 56, at 592. 
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In 1996, both Wisconsin and New Hampshire lowered the upper 
age of juvenile court jurisdiction to the age of sixteen.88 In both the 
1993 and 1995 legislative sessions, Texas legislators introduced three 
bills attempting to lower the maximum age of juvenile court jurisdic-
tion even lower, from sixteen to fourteen years of age.89 
B. Legislation Expanding the Sentencing Power of the Juvenile Court 
Legislation which permits juvenile court judges to treat some 
young offenders like adults is similarly intended to dispense punish-
ment harsh enough to deter and incapacitate serious young offenders. 
Some states narrowly construe the adult sanctioning power granted to 
juvenile court judges.90 They permit incorporation of only a few, spe-
cific adult criminal justice system sanctions into the juvenile justice 
system for use with a narrowly defined class of young offenders.91 Other 
states have provided juvenile court judges with a broad array of adult 
sanctions.92 These states permit juvenile court judges to impose on 
some young offenders any adult sanction available to a criminal court 
judge.93 
l. Specific Authorization to Use Particular Criminal Justice System 
Sanctions 
A few state legislatures have explicitly provided that juvenile court 
judges, at their discretion, may impose certain adult court sanctions 
88 See Coordinating Council, sufrra note 54; OlJDP, sUfrra note 64. New York and Texas also 
have a maximum age of 16 for juvenile court jurisdiction. See N.Y. PENAL LAw § 30.00(1) 
(McKinney 1998); Thx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.02(2)(a) (West 1996). 
89 See Fritsch & Hemmens, sufrra note II, at 599. Interestingly, another punitive trend 
exhibited by the Texas legislature during these two legislative sessions was an attempt to lower 
the minimum age of juvenile court jurisdiction and thus expose younger children to juvenile 
court sentences. See "id. at 597-98. Seven bills proposing to lower the minimum age from ten to 
eight years of age were introduced and two other bills proposed to lower the age minimum to 
seven years of age. See id. at 598. Even more extreme, one Texas state representative recently 
introduced a bill lowering the age of death penalty eligibility from 17 to II. See Roger Cossack, 
Should We be Tougher em Kids Who Kill?, USA WEEKEND, Jun. 28, 1998, at 16; As Youth Violence 
Grows, Many Pemdering: When is a Killer Too Young to Die?, SALT LAKE nuB., Apr. 25, 1998, atA3 
(quoting the vengeful legislator introducing the bill, "There are ll-year-olds out there that would 
be capable of premeditated murder."). 
90 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1663(6)-(7) (Supp. 1997); Ron Smith, 1997 Legislative 
Update, 66]. KAN. B. AsS'N 24, 35 (1997). 
91 See id. 
92 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 119, § 58(a) (West Supp. 1998); see also Fagan, sUfrra 
note II, at 243 (reporting that Texas and New Jersey permit juvenile court judges to impose 
lengthy prison terms for some offenses). 
93 See id. 
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on certain young offenders.94 Judges may impose these sanctions only 
on youths for whom the length of juvenile court jurisdiction has been 
extended beyond the traditional maximum age of jurisdiction, typically 
an extention to the age of twenty-one. 95 These youths have generally 
committed serious offenses or have extensive offense histories.96 
For example, the Kansas 1996 Juvenile Justice Reform Act permits 
juvenile court judges to commit young offenders to a sanctions house 
for up to seven days.97 The commitment is renewable up to a maximum 
twenty-eight day period.98 Furthermore, the Act permits juvenile court 
judges, at their discretion, to commit young offenders aged eighteen 
to twenty-three, who are in violation of their probation, to the county 
jail for up to seven days. 99 
2. Complete Criminal Justice System Sanctioning Power 
In contrast to states granting narrow, specifically delineated adult 
sanctioning power to juvenile courts, a few states have recently enacted 
legislation granting broad, discretionary adult sanctioning power to 
juvenile courts. 1OO These states permit juvenile court judges to impose 
any criminal court sentence on certain classifications of young offend-
ers. 101 These statutes generally apply to older youths charged with a 
felony who have previously been adjudicated delinquentl02 on other 
felony charges, or who were previously committed to a supervising state 
youth agency by a juvenile court. 103 
For example, the Massachusetts 1996 Youthful Offender Act 
grants juvenile court judges the authority to sentence some classes of 
94 See, e.g., RAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1663(6)-(7) (Supp. 1997) 
95 See, e.g., RAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1636(a) (3) (Supp. 1997) (delineating criteria for types of 
youths who are eligible for extended jurisdiction and thus can receive adult court sanctions). 
96 See, e.g., id. 
97 See RAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1663(6) (Supp. 1997); Smith, R., supra note 90, at 35. A sanctions 
house is separate from an adult jail but is not necessarily a juvenile detention center. See RAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 38-1602(n) (Supp. 1997). It is defined as a locked facility with locked rooms and 
physical restraints such as fences surrounding those held inside the facility. See id. 
98 See RAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1663(6) (Supp. 1997); Smith, R., supra note 90, at 35. 
99 See RAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1663(7) (Supp. 1997); Smith, R., supra note 90, at 35. 
100 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 58(a) (West Supp. 1998). 
]0] See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 119, § 58 (West Supp. 1998); N.M. STAT. ANN. 
§ 32A-2-20 (Michie Supp. 1998); Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1996 Survey of Flarida Law, 21 
NOVA L. REv. 189,203 (1996). 
]02 "Adjudicated delinquent" is the equivalent in juvenile court to a finding of guilt in 
criminal court. See Judge Kent Ellis, The Juvenile Justice System: Past and Present, 33 Hous. LAW., 
Nov.-Dec. 1995, at 24, 25; Cintron, supra note 14, at 1259. 
]03See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 58 (West Supp. 1998). 
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youths to any sanction available to a criminal court judge sentencing 
an adult convicted of the same offense. I04 ''Youthful Offenders"105 who 
pose a present and long-term public safety threat are eligible for these 
sentences. I06 In October, 1997 BostonJuvenile Court Judge Paul Lewis 
used the authority granted to him by this law for the first time.107 He 
sentenced a sixteen-year-old youth to a term of four to six years in 
prison after he pled guilty to charges of repeatedly stabbing a man. 108 
C. Extended Jurisdiction Legislation 
Several states have recently enacted extended jurisdiction, or "last 
chance" legislation, which both increases the length of juvenile court 
jurisdiction over a young offender, and exposes the offender to a 
suspended adult correctional sentence (including incarceration in jail 
or prison). 109 Extended jurisdiction statutes typically lengthen juvenile 
court jurisdiction to the age of twenty-one. lJO When the sentenced 
youth reaches the maximum age of juvenile court jurisdiction, the 
youth may be transferred to an adult prison, placed on adult probation 
with the suspended sentence hinging on successful completion of 
probation, or released from the remainder of the sentence.1l1 In some 
states, after a shorter period of commitment, the state youth agency 
104 See MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 119, § 58(a) (West Supp. 1998). 
105 Massachusetts defines "Youthful Offenders" as youths between the ages of 14 and 17 who: 
(1) have committed an offense punishable by imprisonment if the offender were an adult, and 
(2) meet one of three additional elements. See MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 119, § 52 (West 
Supp. 1998). These elements include: (1) the youth was previously committed to the custody of 
the state youth authority, (2) the youth committed an offense involving infliction or threat of 
serious bodily harm, or (3) the youth possessed or distributed an unlawful firearm. See id. 
106 See MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 119, § 58 (West Supp. 1998). 
107 See Juvenile Sent to Adult Prison, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 28, 1997, at B4. 
108 See id. 
I09See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 119, § 58(b) (West Supp. 1998); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 260.126(4) (West 1998); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.073(1) (West 1996 & Supp. 1999); N.M. STAT. 
ANN. § 32A-2-20 (Michie Supp. 1998); David Adkins et al., 1996 Legislative Update, 65J. KAN. B. 
AsS'N 16,25 (1996); Dale, supra note 101, at 203; Fritsch & Hemmens, supra note II, at 58~89; 
Ludwig, supra note 55, at 18; Smith, R., supra note 90, at 35; Del Carlo, supra note 7, at 1246-47. 
1l0See MASS GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 119, § 58(b) (West Supp. 1998); Mo. ANN. STAT. 
§ 211.073(5) (West 1996 & Supp. 1999); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-2-20 (Mitchie Supp. 1998); Del 
Carlo, supra note 7, at 1246; if. Adkins, supra note 109, at 25 (reporting some extensions of 
juvenile court jurisdiction up to the age of 23); Dawson, supra note 7, at 946 (reporting that 
Texas moves the youth to an adult prison at the age of 18). 
III See MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 119, § 58(b) (West Supp. 1998); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 260.126(5) (West 1999); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.073(4), (5) (West 1996 & Supp. 1999); Fritsch 
& Hemmens, supra note II, at 58~89; Del Carlo, supra note 7, at 1246. 
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may elect to transfer a youth to the juvenile probation department for 
transition back into the community.1l2 
The increased length and potentially more severe nature of the 
sentence reflects a desire to increase offender accountability with ret-
ribution for the offender's acts.1l3 However, this legislation is called 
"last chance" legislation in recognition of the conditional opportunity 
it affords young offenders to rehabilitate themselves and avoid a crimi-
nal justice system sanction. 114 Thus, it does not represent as complete 
a departure from rehabilitation as transfer and other punitive sentenc-
ing schemes. 
Two prevalent types of extended jurisdiction legislation are blend-
ed sentencing and determinate sentencing. 
1. Blended Sentencing 
Blended sentencing legislation 115 allows juvenile court judges to 
sentence certain young offenders as juveniles or use a combination of 
juvenile and adult sentencing possibilities. ll6 The length of juvenile 
court jurisdiction is extended to ensure an adequate period of confine-
ment for youths who remain in the juvenile justice system. ll7 Like 
legislation providing juvenile court judges with criminal court sanc-
tions, blended sentencing statutes typically apply to youths between the 
ages of fourteen and seventeen who have been charged with a felony. liB 
Generally, these youths must also have a previous delinquency adjudi-
cation on other felony charges, or must have a previous commitment 
to a supervising state youth agency by a juvenile court.1I9 
112 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 58 (West Supp. 1998); Mo. ANN. STAT. 
§ 211.073(5) (West Supp. 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-2-20 (Michie Supp. 1998); Blegen, 
supra note 11, at 48; Del Carlo, supra note 7, at 1246--47. 
m See Del Carlo, supra note 7, at 1247. 
114 Seeid. at 1246; see also Feld, A Case of &farm, supra note 7, at 1038; Feld, TaskForce, supra 
note 61, at 22. 
115This type oflegislation also is called "dual sentencing" and "combination sentencing." See 
Adkins, supra note 109, at 25; &farm Proposals to Arizona's juvenik justice System, ARIz. ATT'y, 
Feb. 1996, 35, 35 [hereinafter &farm Proposals]; Blegen, supra note 11, at 48; Smith, R, supra 
note 90, at 35; Del Carlo, supra note 7, at 1246. 
116 See &farm Proposals, supra note 115, at 35; Feld, Task Force, supra note 61, at 22. 
117 SeeFeld, TaskForce, supra note 61, at 22-23 (reporting that Minnesota's blended sentenc-
ing statute extends juvenile court jurisdiction for youths designated "Extended Jurisdiction 
Juveniles" to the age of 21); see also MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 119, § 58 (West Supp. 1998) 
(extending juvenile court jurisdiction for youths designated "Youthful Offenders" to the age of 
21). 
118 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 119, § 52 (West Supp. 1998); Feld, TaskForce, supra 
note 61, at 23. 
119 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 52 (West Supp. 1998). 
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For example, under Minnesota's blended sentencing statute, a 
youth may be transferred to criminal court or classified as an "Ex-
tended Jurisdiction Juvenile" following a juvenile court hearing which 
assesses whether the youth poses a public safety threat. 12o Youths eligi-
ble for the Extended Jurisdiction Juvenile classification are between 
the ages of fourteen and seventeen and charged with a felony.121 A 
juvenile court judge finding that the Extended Jurisdiction Juvenile 
committed the charged offense sentences the youth to the custody of 
the state youth agency with a suspended adult criminal court sen-
tence. 122 For Extended Jurisdiction Juveniles, juvenile court jurisdiction 
is extended to the age of twen ty-one. 123 Ajuvenile court judge may, but 
is not required to, impose the suspended adult sentence on an Ex-
tended Jurisdiction Juvenile who violates a condition of his/her sen-
tence or commits a new offense.124 
2. Determinate Sentencing 
Another aspect of extended jurisdiction is determinate sentenc-
ing.125 Determinate sentencing empowers juvenile court judges with 
120 See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.126(1)-(2) (West 1998); Feld, A Case of Reform, supra note 
7, at 1043-45; Feld, Task Farce, supra note 61, at 22. The 1996 Massachusetts Youthful Offender 
Act provides similar blended sentencing provisions. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 52 et 
seq. (West Supp. 1998). A ''Youthful Offender" is a youth between the ages of 14 and 17 who has 
committed an offense punishable by imprisonment, were the youth an adult, and who meets one 
of three conditions. See MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 119, § 52 (West Supp. 1998). Such an 
adolescent is a Youthful Offender if: 1) he/she has a previous commiunent to the Deparunent 
of Youth Services (DYS), 2) his/her offense involved the infliction or threat of serious bodily 
harm, or 3) his/her offense involved possession of an unlicensed firearm, unlicensed shotgun, 
machine gun, or sawed-off shotgun, or their offense involved the sale or distribution of a firearm 
or shotgun. See id. Juvenile court judges may sentence Youthful Offenders who pose a present 
and long-term threat to public safety to one of three general sentencing options, including 
extended jurisdiction. See MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 119, § 58 (West Supp. 1998). Similar to 
Minnesota judges, a Massachusetts juvenile court judge can impose a sentence of commiunent 
to DYS until the age of 21 with an additional suspended adult prison sentence. See MASS. GEN. 
LAws ANN. ch. 119, § 58 (b) (West Supp. 1998). Youths successfully completing the DYS commit-
ment and juvenile probation are released from the suspended sentence at the age of 21. See id. 
121 See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.126(1) (West 1998); Feld, A Case of Reform, supra note 7, at 
1045; Feld, Task Farce, supra note 61, at 23. 
122 See Feld, A Case of Reform, supra note 7, at 1045. 
123 See id. at 1047; Feld, Task Farce, supra note 61, at 23. 
124 See Feld, A Case of Reform, supra note 7, at 1042, 1048-49. The rationale underlying the 
legislature's decision not to require imposition of the suspended sentence for violation of a 
condition is that the legislature did not want a large number of youths to receive adult sanctions 
through summary probation revocation hearings. See id. at 1050. 
125 See Fagan, supra note 11, at 24~44; Fritsch & Hemmens, supra note 11, at 587-95. Related 
to the adoption of determinate sentencing in the juvenile court is the enacunent of juvenile court 
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the authority to impose a specific period of locked confinement on a 
young offender. 126 Generally, part of the sentence is served In state 
youth agency facilities. 127 The remainder is served in prison if, after a 
review of the case when the youth reaches the age of majority, a court 
decides the additional adult sanction is necessary. 128 Many states extend 
the maximum age of juvenile court jurisdiction to afford sentenced 
youths the opportunity to rehabilitate themselves while in youth agency 
facilities before a decision is reached regarding the need for the youth 
to serve additional time in prison.129 Unlike mandatory minimum sen-
tencing, which establishes a statutory floor beneath which a judge may 
not sentence,130 determinate sentencing establishes a statutory ceiling, 
permitting ajudge to sentence a youth anywhere beneath a statutorily 
enunciated maximum sentence.131 
In 1987, Texas adopted determinate sentencing legislation which 
enables juvenile court judges to impose sentences of up to thirty years 
for six serious felony offenses. 132 The statute applies to youths of any 
age, and requires that youths receiving determinate sentences remain 
sentencing guidelines. See Baldi, supra note 56, at 589. Washington was the first state to take such 
a punitive approach toward young offenders through its adoption of sentencing guidelines which 
partially augment and partially replace the traditional rehabilitative goals of the juvenile court. 
See WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 13.40.010(2)(d) (West 1993 & Supp. 1998); Baldi, supra note 56, at 
589-90. The Washington Juvenile Justice Act of 1977 provides statutory sentencing guidelines 
under which juvenile court judges match the offense of the youth to a pre-iietermined sentence. 
See Fagan, supra note 11, at 244; Baldi, supra note 56, at 589. The Act explicitly prohibits a judge 
from considering a youth's background, need for treatment, or rehabilitative potential. See id. 
Sentences are determined based on the youth's age, present offense, and offense history. See id. 
126 See Fritsch & Hemmens, supra note 11, at 589; Feld, A Case of Reform, supra note 7, at 
1039 & n.313; Del Carlo, supra note 7, at 1247-48. "Locked confinement" includes juvenile 
detention centers, juvenile training centers, and adult prisons. See id. 
127 See Fritsch & Hemmens, supra note 11, at 589; Feld, A Case of Reform, supra note 7, at 
1039; Del Carlo, supra note 7, at 1247. 
128 See id. 
129 SeeFeld, A Case of Reform, supra note 7, at 1039 n.313; Del Carlo, supra note 7, at 1247-48. 
130 See Del Carlo, supra note 7, at 1231. 
131 See id.; Fritsch & Hemmens, supra note 11, at 589. 
132 See Thx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.04(d) (3) (West 1996 & Supp. 1999); Fritsch & Hemmens, 
supra note 11, at 588-89. The list of offenses includes: capital murder, attempted capital murder, 
murder, aggravated sexual assault, aggravated kidnapping, and deadly assault on a law enforce-
ment officer, corrections officer, court participant, or on probation personnel. See Fritsch & 
Hemmens, supra note 11, at 589; Dawson, supra note 7, at 946. Similarly, the Virginia Legislature 
has enacted a statute permitting both juvenile court and criminal court judges to sentence 
juvenile "Serious Offenders" to a determinate period of up to seven years. See VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 16.1-285.1(C) (Mitchie 1996); Cullen D. Seltzer, Criminal Law and Procedure, 30 U. RICH. L. 
REv. 1281, 1308 (1996). Unlike the Texas statute, however, Virginia's juvenile court determinate 
sentences may not extend beyond the maximum age of juvenile court jurisdiction, which is the 
age of 21 in Virginia. See id. 
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under juvenile court jurisdiction until the age of eighteen. 133 Following 
the youth's eighteenth birthday, the court conducts a hearing to decide 
whether the youth should remain in a Texas Youth Commission facility 
or whether the youth should complete the remainder of the original 
determinate sentence in a Texas prison. 134 If the judge decides to 
return the youth to the Texas Youth Commission facility, the youth's 
sentence ends with the expiration of juvenile court jurisdiction, which 
occurs when the youth attains the age of twenty-one. 135 
In 1995, the Texas Legislature amended the statute by adding 
fifteen additional felonies to the list and modifYing the determinate 
sentencing structure.136 Youths committing one of the twen ty-one listed 
offenses can now receive sentences of up to forty years for a capital or 
first degree felony, twenty years for a second degree felony, and ten 
years for a third degree felony.137 
Similar to criminal justice sentencing legislation, juvenile justice 
sentencing legislation aims to protect the public from violent offend-
ing by altering the sentence imposed on offenders.13s In some states 
this is accomplished by taking power away from the juvenile court by 
narrowing the scope of offenders who may appear before it and of-
fenses it may address.139 This type of legislation has the effect of placing 
more young offenders in the criminal courts. l40 Other states have 
elected to afford criminal court sanctioning power to juvenile court 
judges so that they may impose more severe sentences on young of-
fenders. 141 States falling in the middle of this power continuum give 
juvenile court judges discretion to impose conditional adult sanctions 
133 See Dawson, supra note 7, at 946-47; Ellis, supra note lO2, at 27; Fritsch & Hemmens, 
supra note 11, at 589. 
134 See TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 54.04(d) (3),54.11 (West 1986 & Supp. 1995); Dawson, supra 
note 7, at 947; Ellis, supra note lO2, at 27; Fritsch & Hemmens, supra note 11, at 589; Del Carlo, 
supra note 7, at 1247. 
135 See id. 
136 See TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.04(d)(3) (West 1996 & Supp. 1999); Fritsch & Hemmens, 
supra note 11, at 594-95. The additional felonies include: aggravated robbery, attempted aggra-
vated robbery, attempted aggravated sexual assault, attempted aggravated kidnapping, attempted 
murder, sexual assault, aggravated assault, felonious injury to a child, elderly person, or disabled 
person, felony deadly conduct involving the discharge of a firearm, aggravated drug offenses, 
criminal solicitation, criminal solicitation of a minor, indecency with a child, attempted indecency 
with a child, and habitual felony conduct (i.e., commission of a felony by a youth with two prior 
felony adjudications). See Fritsch & Hemmens, supra note 11, at 594. 
137 See Fritsch & Hemmens, supra note 11, at 589, 594-95. 
138 See supra Part II Introduction, notes 54-66 and accompanying text. 
139 See supra Part II.A, notes 67-89 and accompanying text. 
140 See supra Part IIA, notes 67-89 and accompanying text. 
141 See supra Part II.B, notes 90-108 and accompanying text. 
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on young offenders. 142 This legislation provides the opportunity for 
rehabilitation with a conditional punitive sentence attached.143 Unfor-
tunately, the impact of these types of sentencing legislation on young 
offenders can be overly punitive and does not satisfy the stated goal of 
protecting public safety. 
III. PROBLEMS MANIFEST WITH THE APPLICATION OF PUNITIVE 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND JUVENILE JUSTICE SENTENCING LEGISLATION 
ON YOUNG OFFENDERS 
In the hurried search for a response to juvenile crime,l44 states did 
not adequately consider the faults that these punitive sentencing ap-
proaches have when applied to young offenders. 
A. The Punitive Effect of Criminal justice System Mandatory Minimum 
Sentencing, Sentence Enhancement Legislation, and Sentencing 
Guidelines on juvenile Offenders 
Criminal justice system mandatory minimum sentencing, sen-
tence enhancements, and sentencing guidelines impact young offend-
ers in several ways. The first portion of this section discusses how the 
federal, and many state, sentencing guidelines use juvenile adjudica-
tions to enhance adult offender sentences, thus inappropriately penal-
izing, and penalizing in an inconsistent manner, offenders for past 
juvenile court involvement. 145 Specifically, the first subsection examines 
the manner by which sentencing guidelines discourage youths from 
seeking services, cause disparity in sentences among adult offenders 
with juvenile adjudications, and disadvantage adult offenders with ju-
venile adjudications due to the lower procedural safeguards available 
in juvenile court.146 The second subsection reveals the manner in which 
transfer and legislation reducing the maximum age of juvenile court 
jurisdiction expose many youths to punitive criminal justice legislation 
142 See supra Part II.C, notes 109-37 and accompanying text. 
143 See supra Part II.C, notes 109-37 and accompanying text. 
144 See, e.g., Youthful Offender Act, ch. 200, § 1 et seq., § 52 et seq., 1996 Mass. Legis. Servo 
1, I (West). In its preamble, the Massachusetts Youthful Offender Act announces its hurried 
nature: "The deferred operation of this act would tend to defeat its purpose, which is to 
immediately provide for an improved system of juvenile justice for the commonwealth, therefore 
it is hereby declared to be an emergency law, necessary for the immediate preservation of the 
public safety and convenience." (emphasis added). See id. 
145 See infra Part IlIA. 1 , notes 150-96 and accompanying text. 
146 See infra Part IlIA. 1 , notes 150-96 and accompanying text. 
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while they are minors.147 Finally, the last subsection discusses the pres-
sure placed on youths to plea bargain with prosecutors to avoid crimi-
nal justice sanctions. l48 As applied, criminal justice legislation yields 
inconsistent results between young offenders, overpenalizes young of-
fenders, disadvantages young offenders as compared to adult offend-
ers, and provides unchecked power to prosecutors. 149 
I. Sentencing Guidelines "Criminalize" Juvenile Offender 
Adjudications 
Section 4A1.2(d) of the federal sentencing guidelines and similar 
state legislation provisions require judges sentencing a convicted adult 
to use the offender's past juvenile offense record to increase his/her 
sentence.150 This is particularly problematic for young offenders be-
cause the differing goals of the juvenile and criminal justice systems 
result in sentences of a different nature. 151 
Juvenile court sentences traditionally focus on treating and reha-
bilitating youths based on a judge'S discretionary assessment of a 
147 See infra Part 1II.A.2, notes 197-221 and accompanying text. 
148 See infra Part 1II.A.3, notes 222-34 and accompanying text. 
149 See infra Part IIIA.l-3, notes 150-234 and accompanying text. 
150 See 18 U.S.C.A. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(d) (1998); Laurel M. Cohn, Annotation, Ccmsideraticm of 
Offenses Committed While a Juvenile in the Comfrutaticm of Criminal History Under United States 
Sentencing Guidelines (18 U.S.C.A. AfrPx § 4Al.2), 135 A.L.R. FED. 619, 627 (1996); Mills, supra 
note 7, at 923 & n.183. The United States Sentencing Guidelines require judges to give sentence 
enhancement points for prior sentences received by juveniles adjudicated delinquent or convicted 
of criminal charges. See id. Each conviction for which a youth received more than one year and 
one month of imprisonment adds three criminal history enhancement points! See § 4Al.2 (d) (1); 
Mills, supra note 7, at 923 n.183; Cohn, supra, at 627. Each juvenile or adult sentence of 
confinement for more than 60 days adds two criminal history points provided that the confine-
ment ended within five years of the current adult criminal charge. See § 4A1.2(d)(2) (A); Mills, 
supra note 7, at 923 n.l83; Cohn, supra, at 627. Similarly, one criminal history point is added for 
each adult or juvenile sentence received within the five year period prior to the current adult 
criminal charge. See § 4A1.2(d) (2) (B); Mills, supra note 7, at 923 n.183; Cohn, supra, at 627. 
These points are added to the points assessed for the particular offense to attain a total score 
which the judge uses to determine the sentence required by the federal sentencing guidelines. 
See § 4A1.2; Mills, supra note 7, at 923 n.183; Cohn, supra, at 627. Some states' sentencing 
guidelines also use past juvenile records to enhance adult sentences. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 609.11 (9) (West 1987 & Supp. 1998). The proposed Massachusetts sentencing guidelines cur-
rently tabled in the legislature also employ juvenile records to enhance adult sentences. See Eric 
T. Berkman, Do Juvenile Adjudications Constitute Prior Crimes? Attorneys: Uncertain Area Requires 
Caution, MASS. LAW. WKLY., June 16, 1997, at Section A. 
151 See David Dormont, Note, For the Good of the Adult: An Examination of the Constituticmality 
of Using Prior Juvenile Adjudicaticms to Enhance Adult Sentences, 75 MINN. L. REv. 1769, 1770, 
1776-77, 1797 (1991); see also Robert E. Shepherd,Jr., TryingJuveniles in Federal Court, 9 CRIM. 
JUST., Fall 1994, at 45, 46; Holden, supra, note 71, at 848. 
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youth's individual characteristics, needs, and history. 152 Sentences often 
last an indefinite period of time, until the state agency supervising the 
offender decides to release him/her. 153 During this period, young of-
fenders receive counseling, education, training, and other services to 
rehabilitate them and reintroduce them into the law-abiding commu-
nity.154 
In contrast, criminal court sentences determined by sentencing 
guidelines intend to punish the offender based on a statutory assess-
ment of the severity of the offense and the offender's past criminal 
history. 155 Sentences are finite and predetermined by statute. 156 Offend-
ers are not ensured of any rehabilitative services and there is no 
emphasis on rehabilitating the offender to fit back into a law-abiding 
society. 157 
'Sentencing guidelines which use juvenile records to increase sen-
tence severity convert a rehabilitative process into a punitive process 
by "criminalizing" juvenile adjudications. 158 The juvenile court's reha-
bilitative-centered sentence is treated as the functional equivalent of a 
punitive-centered criminal justice sentence for purposes of sentencing 
an adult offender.159 Thus, young offenders who subsequently commit 
crimes as adults are penalized for their past contact with the juvenile 
court. 160 
Penalizing youths who later commit crimes as adults by using their 
delinquency adjudications as the equivalent of criminal convictions to 
increase sentence length is an unfair detriment with disparate results 
for three principal reasons. First, it discourages youths from seeking 
rehabilitation or other treatment assistance services from juvenile 
court. Second, the discretion central to the juvenile court causes dis-
parity in adult offender sentences under sentencing guidelines. Third, 
152 See Ludwig, supra note 55, at 18; Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., What Does the Public lUaUy 
Want?, 11 CRIM.JUST. 51, 51 (1996) [hereinafter Shepherd, What Does the Public lUally Want?]; 
Tompkins et al., supra note 55, at 1629-30; Laura Sessions Stepp, The Crackdoum on Juvenile 
Crime; Do Stricter Laws Deter Youths?, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 1994, at AI. 
55. 
15S See Ellis, supra note 102, at 26; United States v. Pinto, 875 F.2d 56,145 (7th Cir. 1989). 
154 See Ludwig, supra note 55, at 18; Stepp, supra note 152; see aLso other sources cited in note 
155 See Alschuler, supra note 9, at 907-08; Reitz, supra note 46, at 1464. 
156 See Alschuler, supra note 9, at 907-08; Hatch, supra note 9, at 188-89. 
157 See Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, The Evolution of Adolescence: A Developmental 
Perspective on Juvenile Justice IUfurm, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137, 186 (1997); Cintron, 
supra note 14, at 1282; Klein, supra note 55, at 403-04; see aLso English, supra note 55, at 25. 
158 See Dormont, supro.note 151, at 1770,1797. 
159 See ill. at 1770, 1798. 
160 See id. 
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the lower procedural safeguards available to young offenders in juve-
nile court create a greater likelihood that a young offender will be 
adjudicated delinquent. 
a. Youths Are Discouraged from Seeking Juvenile Court Rehabilitation 
Services 
Sentencing guidelines' juvenile record enhancement provisions 
may discourage youths from admitting to their offenses because crimi-
nal courts can later penalize them for any delinquency adjudication. 161 
As a result, youths may become trained, and are likely to be counseled 
by their attorneys, to deny all involvement in any offense with which 
they are charged.162 It is unlikely that a youth who continually denies 
committing the offense with which he/she is charged, and takes no 
responsibility for the harm caused, will benefit from rehabilitative 
services, because rehabilitation hinges on the youth's recognition of 
and willingness to change his/her problematic behavior. Hig Discourag-
ing youths from seeking treatment and rehabilitative assistance from 
juvenile court thus undermines the purpose for which the court was 
created.164 In effect, the juvenile court then becomes a criminal court 
for young persons. l65 
b. Juvenile Court Use of Discretion Causes Disparity 
Furthermore, the discretion central to the juvenile justice system 
translates into disparity when juvenile records are used to increase 
adult sentences. This inequitable sentence disparity is due to variations 
in juvenile court sentence length based on type of offense and consid-
eration of individual offender characteristics. 
161 See id. at 1797-98 (asserting that therapeutic assumptions generally held by attorneys and 
judges are out of sync with the punitive sentencing guidelines and stating the need for juveniles, 
their attorneys, and judges to recognize that "therapeutic incarceration for the child's good works 
to the adult's detriment."). 
162 See id. at 1797-98. 
165 See Dormont, supra note 151, at 1797-98; Sheffer, supra note 11, at 482. 
164 See Dormont, supra note 151, at 1770,1798 & 1797 n.146. 
165 See id. at 1798; Cintron, supra note 14, at 1275. 
1999] JUVENILE SENTENCING 
1. Differences in Number of Sentencing Guidelines' Criminal 
History Points Available Due to Length of Juvenile 
Adjudication Sentence 
647 
Under the federal sentencing guidelines, two criminal history 
enhancement points are assigned to a young offender sentenced by 
the juvenile court to confinement of at least sixty days.166 In addition, 
one point is available for each additional, less severe sentence im-
posed.167 There is no limit to the maximum number of enhancement 
points, provided that all sentences were within five years of the present 
offense.16S The criminal history enhancement points accumulated for 
past juvenile and adult offenses are combined to increase the severity 
of the sentenced imposed.169 
The disparity caused by the number of points accumulated is 
apparent when comparing a youth adjudicated delinquent on a charge 
of aggravated rape with a youth adjudicated delinquent on several 
occasions for shoplifting. The youth who commits aggravated rape 
might remain in the locked facilities of the state youth authority during 
the majority of his adolescence.170 This youth spends little time in the 
community, thus he/she has had scarcely any opportunity to re-of-
fend.l7l If this is the only offense committed as a youth, he/she can 
only receive a maximum of two criminal history points for his/her 
juvenile record, if the offender is later convicted as an adult. 172 
166 See Dormont, supra note 151, at 1769 n.4; Mills, supra note 7, at 923 n.183. Section 
4A1.2(d)(2)(A) of the federal sentencing guidelines provides that a convicted offender can 
receive two criminal history points for each juvenile sentence of confinement of at least sixty days 
if released from confinement within five years of his or her present offense. See Dormont, supra 
note 151, at 1769 n.4; Mills, supra note 7, at 923 n.l83, 923-24. Criminal history points are added 
to points given for the offender's adult offense record to determine the sentencing range category 
into which the offender fits. See Mills, supra note 7, at 923-24; Cohn, supra note 150, at 627. The 
greater the number of criminal history points, the more severe the sentencing range. See Dor-
mont, supra note 151, at 1773-74. 
167 See Dormont, supra note 151, at 1769 n.4; Mills, supra note 7, at 923 n.183; Cohn, supra 
note 150, at 627. Section 4A1.2(d) (2) (8) provides that a convicted offender can receive one point 
for each juvenile sentence imposed within five years of his or her present offense. See id. 
168 See Dormont, supra note 151, at 1773-74; Mills, supra note 7, at 924. The United States 
Sentencing Guidelines do not cap the number of criminal history points available from ajuvenile 
record. See id. Some states do limit the number of criminal history points for juvenile sentences. 
See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244 APP. (II)(8)(4)(e) (West 1992 & Supp. 1998). 
169 See Dormont, supra note 151, at 1773; Mills, supra note 7, at 923-24. 
170 See Dormont, supra note 151, at 1802. 
171 See ill. 
172 See id. 
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In contrast, the youth who commits numerous shoplifting offenses 
can receive one criminal history point for each offense with nearly no 
maximum on the total number. 173 Thus, under the federal sentencing 
guidelines, if the two commit the same or similar offenses as adults, the 
offender with a violent juvenile offense record can receive a shorter, 
less severe sentence than the offender with a nonviolent juvenile of-
fense record. 174 
ii. Differences in Number of Sentencing Guidelines' Criminal 
History Points Available Due to IndividualizedJuvenile 
Court Sentencing 
Furthermore, the discretionary nature of the juvenile justice sys-
tem encourages juvenile court judges to consider individual factors to 
create individualized sentences for young offenders.175 This leads to 
different sentences for the same offense.176 
For example, a juvenile court judge might divert a youth commit-
ting motor vehicle theft to a community service program because the 
youth regularly attends school and has a supportive family. 177 The same 
judge might sentence another youth committing motor vehicle theft 
to a period of locked confinement because the youth is believed to be 
an active gang member and lives in an unstable family environment.178 
Under the federal sentencing guidelines, the first youth cannot receive 
any criminal history enhancement points for his/her adjudication 
whereas the second youth can receive one or two points (depending 
on the length of locked confinement, if any) .179 Thus, for purposes of 
criminal court sentencing, one offender has a juvenile record requir-
ing criminal history enhancement points and one does not. lSO As an 
m See ill. at 1802,1769 n.4, 1773-74; Mills, supra note 7, at 923 n.183, 924. The only limitation 
is that all offenses for which points are received must have been committed, or their locked 
confinement sentences completed, within the last five years. See Dormont, supra note 151, at 1769 
n.4; Mills, supra note 7, at 923 n.183. 
174 See Dormont, supra note 151, at 1801-02; supra notes 166-73 and accompanying text. 
175 See Feld, A Case of Refurm, supra note 7, at 970-71; Feld, Principle of the Offense, supra 
note 67, at 477; Holden, supra note 71, at 848; Adam D. Kamenstein, Note, The Inner-Morality of 
JuvenileJustice: The Casefor Ctmsistency and Legality, 18 CARDOZO L. REv. 2lO5, 2124 (1997). 
176 SeeFeld, Principle of the Offense, supra note 67, at 477; Dormont, supra note 151, at 1801; 
Kamenstein, supra note 175, at 2124. 
177 See Dormont, supra note 151, at 1801. 
178 See id. 
179 See ill. at 1769 n.4; Mills, supra note 7, at 923 n.183. 
180 See Dormont, supra note 151, at 1801-02 & 1802 n.178. 
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adult, the offender with the criminal history enhancement points is 
likely to receive a longer sentence. lSI 
c. The Lack of Procedural Safeguards Available to Young Offenders in 
Juvenile Court Harms Convicted Adult Offenders with Juvenile 
Records 
Using juvenile records to enhance sentences under sentencing 
guidelines also disadvantages youths because the juvenile justice system 
does not employ the same procedural safeguards available in adult 
courts. 182 These lower procedural safeguards create a greater likelihood 
that a young offender will be adjudicated delinquent than an adult 
offender, who is entitled to more rigorous procedural safeguards, will 
be found guilty.183 First, unlike adults, youths are not constitutionally 
entitled to a jury trial. 184 The option to have a jury trial gives adult 
offenders bargaining power to discuss a plea agreement with prosecu-
tors who may not have sufficient amounts of time to try all their 
scheduled jury trials, may wish to conserve resources for particular 
cases, may not be certain they have a strong case, or may fear a 
"merciful jury" in the case. 185 It may also be more difficult to obtain 
the unanimous guilty verdict necessary for a jury to convict an offender 
than to convince a single judge of an offender's guilt. IS6 
Second, a diminished Fourth Amendment search and seizure stan-
dard is applicable to searches of youths and their property in school. 187 
As a result, youths can be charged with offenses such as drug or 
weapon possession more easily than adults because it is constitutional 
to search them with a lesser degree of suspicion than required for a 
constitutional search of an adult. 188 Moreover, unlike adults, juveniles 
may be stopped and searched if they are suspected of committing a 
181 See iii. at 1773; Mills. supra note 7. at 923-24. 
182 See Dormont. supra note 151. at 1792. 1798-99. 
183 See id. at 1799. 
184 See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania. 403 U.S. 528. 545 (1971). 
185 See Lowenthal. supra note 8. at 107. 
186 See generaUy Rebecca Snyder Bromley. Jury Leniency in Drinking and Driving Cases, Has 
it Changed? 1958 Versus 1993. 20 L. & PSYCHOL. REv. 27 (1993). Not all states require unanimous 
jury decisions. However. even in these states a large majority of the 12 possible votes (between 9 
and 11) are necessary to convict. See Robert H. Miller. Comment. Six of One is Not a Dozen of the 
Other: A Reexamination of Williams v. Florida and the Size of State Criminal Juries. 146 U. PA. L. 
REv. 621. 631 (1998);Jeremy Osher. Note.]ury Unanimity in California: Should it Stay or Should 
it Go? 29 Loy. LA. REv. 1319. 1330-32 (1996). 
187 See New Jersey v. T.L.O .• 469 U.S. 325. 341--42 (1985). 
188 See iii. 
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status offense. IB9 Again, these searches subsequent to a stop for a status 
offense may yield illegal objects such as drugs, alcohol, or weapons 
which result in offense charges in circumstances under which an adult 
could not be searched. 190 Thus, young offenders can be adjudicated 
delinquent on offense charges resulting from search and seizure pro-
cedures that would, in the adult context, produce inadmissible evi-
dence. 19l 
Finally, although sentencing guidelines do not permit sentence 
increases for juvenile status offenses, juvenile court judges can hold a 
status offender in contempt of court for violating a court order and 
sen tence the offender to a short period of locked confinemen t. 192 This 
period of locked confinement can add one or two criminal history 
sentence enhancement points if the youth is subsequently convicted of 
an offense as an adult.193 In contrast, an adult, by definition, cannot 
commit a status offense and therefore can never receive criminal 
history points for violation of a status offense order.194 
Thus, it is apparent that the less rigorous procedural safeguards 
employed in juvenile court proceedings are more likely to yield sen-
tences for which sentencing guideline criminal history points must be 
given. 195 As a result of the juvenile court discretion exercised in sen-
tencing young offenders, the severity of sentencing guidelines is likely 
to be disproportionate and disparate for adult offenders with juvenile 
delinquency adjudications. 196 
189 See id. at 341-45. A status offense is conduct which would be legal if committed by an 
adult. See Mills, supra note 7, at 912; Cohn, supra note 150, at 628. Common S'4tus offense charges 
include: truancy, running away, curfew violation, ungovernability, and liquor'law infringements. 
See Randall G. Shelden et al., Do Status Offenders Get Worse? Some Clarifications an the Questian 
of Escalatian, 35 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 202, 204 (1989). 
190 See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341-45. 
191 See id. at 341, 348 (Powell, J., concurring). 
192 See Juvenile Justice Delinquency & Prevention Act 42 U.S.CA. § 5633(a)(12)(A) (1995); 
Dormont, supra note 151, at 1802 n.177. For example, in some states, ajuvenile court judge may 
hold a truant in contempt of court if the judge ordered the status offender to attend school and 
he/she failed to do so. See Dormont, supra note 151, at 1802 n.177. Furthermore, ajuvenile court 
judge deciding the disposition of a young offender's case may determine that the offender's past 
status offenses necessitate the need for a sentence including locked confinement. See id. A 
criminal court judge may not use the status offenses to increase a criminal conviction sentence. 
See id.; Cohn, supra note 150, at 629, 639-40. However, in effect, the criminal court judge is 
indirectly using status offenses as enhancement because the juvenile court disposition, including 
locked confinement, was based on past status offenses. 
193 See Dormont, supra note 151, at 1769 n.4; Mills, supra note 7, at 923 n.183. 
194 See Cohn, supra note 150, at 628; Mills, supra note 7, at 912. 
195 See Dormont, supra note 151, at 1799. 
196 See supra Part IIIA.l, notes 150-95 and accompanying text. 
1999] JUVENILE SENTENCING 651 
2. Dual Enhancement 
Legislatures creating and amending juvenile justice statutes to 
effect a more punitive approach often impose extraordinarily harsh 
penalties on young offenders. 197 When the scope of the juvenile justice 
legislation intersects with that of criminal justice sentencing statutes, 
many young offenders face a dual enhancemenL I9B 
Dual enhancement results from a combination of legislation 
which subjects a young offender to two penalties. First, juvenile justice 
legislation places some young offenders in criminal court with its 
attendant exposure to adult sanctions. 199 Second, punitive criminal 
justice sentencing legislation imposes severe sentences on these youths 
through mandatory minimum sentences, sentence enhancements, and 
sentencing guidelines.20o 
Dual enhancement is most apparent in the cases of young offend-
ers subjected to automatic transfer legislation. 201 Youths charged with 
statutorily enumerated offenses are first transferred to the criminal 
court system where they are exposed to adult criminal sanctions.202 
Criminal sanctions for serious offenses are based on retribution, inca-
paci tation, and general deterrence punishment justifications. 203 Crimi-
nal sanctions are intended to be more severe than juvenile court 
sanctions, which are traditionally based on a rehabilitative, treatment 
approach. 204 
197 See Emanuel Margolis, Cunnecticut's War un Drugs: A Peace Proposal, 70 CONN. B.]. 372, 
381 (1996); Del Carlo, supra note 7, at 1231. 
198 See Del Carlo, supra note 7, at 1231. 
199 See OlJDP, supra note 64. 
200 See supra Part I, notes 17-53 and accompanying text. 
201 Juvenile justice legislation reducing the maximum age of juvenile court jurisdiction and 
other types of transfer legislation have the same effect. See supra Part II.A, notes 67-89 and 
accompanying text. 
202 See OlJDP, supra note 64. Criminal court sanctions include a term in jailor state prison, 
life imprisonment, and death. Prior to the adoption of blended sentencing schemes by some 
states, none of these sanctions were available to juvenile court judges. Unlike a criminal court 
judge, most juvenile court judges-those in jurisdictions without criminal justice sanctioning 
power vested in the juvenile court-have no authority to sentence a youth to a term of years in 
prison. See Minnesota Supreme Court Advisury Furce un the Juvenile Justice System: Final Repurt, 20 
WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 595, 635 (1994);Judge Michael Foellger et al., Transfer Issues: Rehabilita-
tion ur Punishment?, 4 FALL Ky. CHILDREN'S RTS.]. 1, 1 (1995). 
203 See Heglin, supra note 7, at 217-19. 
204 See REAL WAR ON CRIME, supra note 6, at 130; Cintron, supra note 14, at 125S-59; 
Dormont, supra note 151, at 1770,1776-77. 
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Once transferred to criminal court, these youths face the second 
punitive measure of mandatory sentences, sentence enhancements, 
and sentencing guidelines in the criminal justice system.205 Thus, in 
effect, these transferred youths are subjected to two punitive meas-
ures-a dual enhancement. 
For example, with the passage of Ballot Measure 11 in November 
1994, Oregon imposed mandatory prison sentences on youths, ages 
fifteen and older, convicted of certain felonies. 206 The mandatory mini-
mum sentences are exceptionally punitive207-the lowest mandatory 
minimum sentence is five years and ten months. 20B Furthermore, 
youths sentenced under the mandatory minimum provisions are not 
eligible for parole.209 These provisions do not distinguish between 
sentences imposed on youths and adults.210 
In addition, Ballot Measure 11 imposes stricter sentences on the 
transferred youth than the state sentencing guidelines would impose 
on an adult convicted of the same offense.211 For example, while the 
Ballot Measure 11 statute imposes a sentence of five years and ten 
months imprisonment for a second degree robbery offense, the Ore-
gon sentencing guidelines set a minimum sentence of two years and 
six months imprisonment. 212 Similarly, Ballot Measure 11 imposes a six 
year and three month sentence for second degree manslaughter, but 
the sentencing guidelines only require a sentence ranging from one 
year and four months to three years and nine months of imprison-
ment.213 
Dual enhancement is especially problematic for youths trans-
ferred for strict liability offenses, such as school zone legislation, in 
which the offender's intent is irrelevant.214 In most school zone statutes, 
205 See genlffally Alschuler, supra note 9; Hatch, supra note 9; Lowenthal, supra note 9; Oliss, 
supra note 22. 
206 See Del Carlo, supra note 7, at 1224, 1231. The statutorily enumerated felonies include: 
murder, attempt or conspiracy to commit aggravated murder, first and second degree manslaugh-
ter, first and second degree kidnapping, first and second degree rape, first and second degree 
sodomy, first and second degree unlawful sexual penetration, first degree sexual abuse, first and 
second degree robbery, and first and second degree assault. See id. at 1231 n.66. 
207 See id. at 1232. 
208 See id. 
209 See id. at 1231. 
210 See id. at 1232. 
211 See Del Carlo, supra note 7, at 1231-32. 
212 See id. at 1232. 
213 See id. 
214 See, e.g., 705 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 405/5-4 (6)-(7) (West 1992 & Supp. 1998). 
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mere possession of a weapon is sufficient for conviction regardless of 
the youth's purpose in carrying the gun.215 
School zone legislation, created to reduce violence in schools, is 
aimed at gangs because they demonstrate a willingness to use force. 216 
However, the statutes are not limited to possession of weapons by gang 
members;217 any youth possessing a weapon is subject to the same 
penalties under the statute.218 Many youths carry a gun, knife, or 
other weapon to protect themselves from the victimization they fear at 
school, not to aggress against or threaten others.219 As a director of 
safety and security for a Massachusetts public school system observed, 
Good kids have guns .... From a district attorney's perspec-
tive, a good kid would never carry a gun, but the DAs don't 
live in the projects. There's so much fear. Good kids who want 
215 See, e.g., Gun-Free School Zone Act of 1995, CAL. PENAL CODE § 626.9(a)-(b) (West 
Supp. 1999); 705 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 405/5-4 (6) (a), (7) (a) (West 1992 & Supp. 1998). 
216 See Julius Menacker, Getting Tough on School-Connected Crime in Illinois, 51 EDUC. LAW 
REp. 347, 347-48 (1989); Martin J. O'Hara, Note, Is It a Crime to Live in Public Housing? A 
Proposal to the Illinois General Assembly to Amend the Automatic Transfer Statute, 27 J. MARSHALL 
L. REv. 855, 856-57 (1994). 
217 See, e.g., Gun-Free School Zone Act of 1995, CAL. PENAL CODE § 626.9(a) (West 
Supp. 1999); 705 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 405/5-4 (6)(a), (7)(a) (West 1992 & Supp. 1998). 
218 See id. 
219 See Bogos, supra note 78, 362-63; Peter Applebome, Perspective: Youth and Violence / / Fear 
Forcing Changes in Behavior, Hapes of Teen Generation, ORANGE COUNTY REG. (Cal.), Jan. 12, 1996, 
at A3. In his article on the Michigan school zone statute, Paul M. Bogos reports that a United 
States Department of Justice survey estimates that nine percent of public school students have 
experienced one or more violent crimes while attending school. See Bogos, supra note 78, at 362. 
Bogos also reports that the National Education Association asserts that 2,000 students are attacked 
at school every hour and 100,000 students carry guns to school each day. See id. The United 
States Department of Justice has found that 91.6% of public and private high school seniors 
report worrying about crime and violence. See id. at 363; Applebome, supra. A poll of 2,000 
teenagers, financed by the Department of Justice, revealed that one of eight youths (nearly two 
of five in high<rime areas) said they carried a weapon for protection from violence. See Apple-
borne, supra. In addition, one of nine youths (more than one of three in high<rime areas) stated 
they had missed school on occasion because they were afraid to attend. See id. Furthermore, a 
recent National Criminal Justice Commission survey ofinner<ity high schools revealed that nearly 
one in four students said that they possessed a firearm at some point in their lives. See REAL WAR 
ON CRIME, supra note 6, at 136. Commentator T. Marcus Funk finds that economically disadvan-
taged persons are more often victims of crime; police do not offer as much protection to lower 
income communities as they afford more affluent, less crime-ridden neighborhoods; and the 
police force cannot provide adequate individual protection. See T. Marcus Funk, Comment, Gun 
Control and Economic Discrimination, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 764, 800-801 (1995). As a 
result, economically disadvantaged persons often purchase a gun for personal protection. See id. 
at 801. Funk advocates harsher penalties for the use of a gun in the commission of a violent 
offense and for the possession of stolen guns, but he argues that the law should not penalize 
persons possessing a gun to protect themselves. See id. at 804. 
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to go to school and do the right thing-they're afraid of 
gangs and the drug dealers; they want to protect themselves 
and their families. Good kids, bad kids-the categories don't 
applyanymore.22o 
Thus, if charged with possession of a weapon in a school zone, these 
youths, like gang members who carry weapons with the intent to 
use them, are subjected to the dual enhancement of transfer and 
criminal justice sentencing legislation.221 
3. Pressure to Plea Bargain 
Criminal justice system sentencing guidelines, mandatory mini-
mum, and sentence enhancement legislation all pressure transferred 
youths to plea bargain to avoid the severe sanctions the criminal justice 
system imposes. 222 In courts bound by any of this sentencing legislation, 
a transferred youth often faces a severe sentence that the judge may 
not reduce regardless of mitigating factors such as age, personal char-
acteristics, or other circumstances.223 A prosecutor, however, may 
charge a youth with a sentence enhancement provision even when 
mitigating circumstances suggest that the enhancement provision 
should not be enforced.224 Thus, the prosecutor can increase the risks 
facing a youth who elects to go to trial therefore encouraging the youth 
to plea bargain. 225 
The percentage of cases proceeding to trial after the 1978 enact-
ment of sentence enhancement legislation in Arizona demonstrates 
the pressure to plea bargain.226 One provision of this statute requires 
sentence enhancement for offenders convicted of "dangerous" of-
fenses, which are defined as felonies in which the offender inflicts 
serious physical injury or uses a weapon.227 Another legislative provi-
sion requires sentence enhancement for convicted "repetitive" felony 
offenders, which is a label for offenders who continue to commit 
felonies after an initial felony conviction.228 The percentage of Ari-
220 Smith, A., supra note 16, at 959 (quoting John Silva). 
221 See, e.g., Gun-Free School Zone Act of 1995, CAL. PENAL CODE § 626.9(a)-(b) (West 
Supp. 1999); 705 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 405/5-4 (6)(a), (7)(a) (West 1992 & Supp. 1998). 
222 See Hatch, supra note 9, at 191; Lowenthal, supra note 8, at 77-78. 
22~ See Alschuler, supra note 9, at 908; Lowenthal, supra note 8, at 104, 121-22. 
224 See Lowenthal, supra note 8, at 78. 
225 See id. at 78-79. 
226 See id. at 79-85. 
227 See id. at 81. 
228 See id. 
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zona's criminal cases proceeding to trial following adoption of the 
1978 sentencing provisions dropped dramatically.229 In the two years 
prior to the 1978 legislation, 8.74% of cases in the Phoenix area 
proceeded to tria1.230 In the three years following the adoption of the 
1978 legislation, the percentage of cases proceeding to trial sharply 
decreased to 5.73%.231 
Furthermore, research suggests that Arizona prosecutors use these 
legislative provisions to pressure offenders to plea bargain by charging 
the offenders with sentence enhancement offenses but later dropping 
these charges.232 In a twelve month period during 1989 and 1990, 
prosecutors dismissed repetitive offender charges in 76% of the cases 
in which they were brought.233 Prosecutors dropped dangerous felony 
charges in 77% of such cases.234 
i 
B. As Applied, Juvenile Justice System Punitive Sentencing Legislation 
Does Not Meet Its Stated Goal 
The purpose of subjecting young offenders to more punitive sen-
tences is three-fold: to deter other youths from committing offenses, 
to prevent young offenders from re-offending, and to keep young 
offenders locked up for long periods of time. 235 The over-arching goal 
is to protect the public from juvenile offending.236 However, shifting 
youths into criminal court jurisdiction237 does not necessarily deter 
crime, prevent recidivism, or incapacitate offenders for longer periods 
of time than juvenile court sentences.238 Thus, punitive sentencing 
measures are ineffective at protecting public safety.239 
229 See Lowenthal, supra note 8, at 79-80, 83. 
230 See id. 
231 See id. 
232 See id. at 82. 
233 See id. 
234See Lowenthal, supra note 8, at 82. Similarly, in 1991, the United States Sentencing 
Commission concluded that plea bargaining to avoid conviction on a more serious charge 
occurred in 17% of federal criminal cases. See Hatch, supra note 9, at 191. 
235 See Fagan, supra note II, at 242-43; Streib, supra note 73, at 429, 432. 
236 See Streib, supra note 73, at 432. 
237 Most commonly this is accomplished through juvenile transfer and legislation reducing 
the maximum age of young offenders eligible for juvenile court jurisdiction. See supra Part IIA, 
notes 67-89 and accompanying text. 
238 See Fagan, supra note II, at 238-39; D'Ambra, Waiver Statutes in Rlwde Island, supra note 
69, at 29; Cintron, supra note 14, at 1274; Sheffer, supra note 11, at 500-01. 
239 See D'Ambra, Waiver Statutes in Rlwde Island, supra note 69, at 29; Cintron, supra note 
14, at 1274. 
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First, there is little evidence that transferring young offenders to 
criminal court for trial and sentencing deters other youths from of-
fending. 240 This is because youths tend to act impulsively and do not 
plan their actions like adults. 241 As Ohio Northern University College 
of Law Dean Victor L. Streib wryly comments, 
A fundamental premise [of general deterrence theory] ... is 
that young teenagers prone to employing violence in their 
interpersonal relationships will engage in an informed cost/ 
benefit analysis before acting. If, instead, such young teenag-
ers typically are unaware of reports on the six o'clock news 
and tend to act impulsively and without thinking, then this 
general deterrence theory would not apply to them.242 
Thus, a punitive legislative response to juvenile offending is unlikely 
to stop other youths from offending.243 
Furthermore, there is no noticeable reduction of repeat offend-
ing. In contrast, research indicates that transferred young offenders 
sentenced in criminal court are more likely to re-offend than young 
offenders retained and adjudicated in juvenile court. 244 A 1991 U.S. 
Department of Justice study found that youths sentenced by New York 
and New Jersey criminal courts were more frequently re-arrested than 
youths adjudicated in New York and New Jersey juvenile courts. 245 
Moreover, they were re-arrested sooner following their criminal court 
convictions than youths appearing in juvenile court who were re-ar-
rested following their juvenile court adjudications. 246 
Recent research conducted in Florida yielded similar results. 247 
Researchers compared recidivism outcomes of youths transferred to 
criminal court and sentenced to adult incarceration with youths re-
240 See, e.g., Del Carlo, supra, note 7, at 1242. 
241 See Feld, Principle of the Offense, supra note 67, at 524-26; Franklin E. Zimring, Kids, 
Groups and Crime: Some Implications of a Well-Knawn Secret, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 867, 
883-84 (1981) [hereinafter Zimring, Kids, Groups and Crime); Del Carlo, supra note 7, at 1241-42; 
see also Sheffer, supra note 11, at 509. 
242Streib, supra note 73, at 432 n.22. 
243 See Feld, Principle of the Offense, supra note 67, at 524-26; Zimring, Kids, Groups and Crime, 
supra note 241, at 883-84; Del Carlo, supra note 7, at 1241-42. 
244 See Blegen, supra note 11, at 50; Donna M. Bishop et aI., The Transfer of Juveniles to 
Criminal Court: Does it Make a Difference?, 42 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 171, 182-83 (1996); Stepp, 
supra note 152; Smith, A., supra note 16, at 1008-09; Crackdoum on Crime Could Backfire on States, 
USA TODAY,july 11, 1996, at lOA. 
245 See Blegen, supra note 11, at 50; Stepp, supra note 152. 
246 See id. 
247 See Bishop et aI., supra note 244, at 171, 182-83. 
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tained in the juvenile justice system and held in juvenile facilities. 248 
The study matched youths in the transferred group with youths in the 
non-transferred group on seven variables. 249 These variables included: 
age, race, gender, offense for which the youth was transferred, number 
of counts of the charges on which the youth was transferred, number 
of prior referrals to the juvenile justice system, and the most serious 
prior offense.25o 
Results of the Florida research revealed that transferred youths 
commit more offenses upon release from incarceration than juveniles 
not transferred. 251 Upon release from prison, 30% of the transferred 
youths studied were re-arrested; 93% of these arrests were for felo-
nies. 252 In contrast, upon release from juvenile facilities, only 19% of 
the non-transferred youths in the study were re-arrested. 253 Of the 19%, 
85% of the youths were re-arrested on felony charges.254 These results 
suggest that incarcerated transferred youths may pose a greater threat 
to society than young offenders not transferred because they are more 
likely to re-offend upon release and more likely to commit more violent 
offenses than non-transferred youths. 255 
Finally, stricter sentencing does not necessarily provide for longer 
periods of incapacitation. Results vary regarding length of sentence 
imposed on young offenders by juvenile and criminal court judges. 256 
Some studies find that criminal courts impose longer sentences on 
young offenders than juvenile courts. 257 Other studies have found the 
opposi te result. 258 
248 See id. at 183. 
249 See id. at 176. 
250 See id. 
251 See id. at 182-83. 
252 See Bishop et al., supra note 244, at 182. 
253 See id. 
254 See id. at 182-83. 
255 See id. at 183-84. The authors of the study suggest that this result may reflect the idea 
that transfer to criminal court indicates to transferred youths that they are societal outcasts. See 
id. at 184. A second explanation the authors provide is based on other research which suggests 
that if an offender believes a sanctioning agent, or the community it represents, unjustly treated 
the offender, he/she is more likely to re-{)ffend out of anger and defiance. See id. at 185. In either 
scenario, the released transferred offender is likely to eschew societal norms and re-{)ffend again. 
See id. at 184-85. 
256 See id. at 183; Blegen, supra note 11, at 50; O'Connor & Treat, supra note 55; at 1310-11; 
Stepp, supra note 152. 
257 See Bishop et al., supra note 244, at 183; O'Connor & Treat, supra note 55, at 1310-11. 
258 See Blegen, supra note 11, at 50; O'Connor & Treat, supra note 55, at 1311; Stepp, supra 
note 152. 
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One reason for this discrepancy is that, unlike criminal court 
judges, juvenile court judges have repeated exposure to re-offending 
young offenders.259 They may be inclined to increase the penalty im-
posed on a youth each time the youth reappears before them in the 
juvenilecourt.260 In contrast, criminal court judges who have limited-
if any-exposure to young offenders are more likely to impose a 
lenient sentence in deference to the youth's lack of maturity and age. 261 
Another reason for the discrepancy in sentencing is that prosecu-
tors may often plea bargain in criminal court cases to a sentence 
including less time in locked confinement than the young offender 
would receive in juvenile court.262 They may even dismiss the charges 
against a youth altogether. 263 A common underlying rationale for such 
lenient treatment by prosecutors is a choice by the prosecutor to 
preserve resources in order to seek convictions for dangerous adult 
offenders with long criminal records. 264 
Thus, it is apparent that current punitive sentencing legislation is 
both overly harsh on young offenders and ineffective in meeting its 
intended goals. 265 There is evidence that the latest juvenile justice 
sentencing statutes do not deter other youths from criminal activity, 
do not curb or prevent recidivism, and do not necessarily incapacitate 
young offenders for longer periods of time than older rehabilitation-
based sentencing legislation.266 
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 
Young offenders have challenged the constitutio~ality of these 
punitive criminal justice and juvenile justice system sentencing statutes 
without success.267 However, in light of current punitive attitudes to-
259 See D'Arnbra, Why Waiver is Not a Panacea, supra note 61, at 278 (quoting Sarah Glazer, 
JuvenileJustice: Should Violent Youths Get Tougher Punishments?, CQ RESEARCHER, Feb. 25, 1994, 
at 1). 
260 See id. 
26] See O'Connor & Treat, supra note 55, at 1314-15. To impose a more lenient sentence on 
a young offender, the criminal court judge must not preside over cases in a jurisdiction with 
sentencing legislation which dictates mandatory sentences. See Lowenthal, supra note 8, at 
121-22; Oliss, supra note 22, at 1854. 
262 See O'Connor & Treat, supra note 55, at 1314. 
263 See id. at 1315; Neal, supra note 15. 
264 See O'Connor & Treat, supra note 55, at 1315. 
265 See supra Part 1II.A, notes 150-234 and accompanying text. 
266 See supra Part 1II.B, notes 235-64 and accompanying text. 
267 See infra Part IVA, notes 270-99 and accompanying text. 
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ward young offenders,268 these laws are unlikely to change soon. The 
future of the juvenile court is in jeopardy, and, if current trends 
continue, a rehabilitative system for youths may cease to exist.269 
A. Failed Constitutional Challenges to Punitive Sentencing Legislation 
Young offenders cannot avoid the problematic sentencing legisla-
tion of the criminal and juvenile justice systems. Given today's widely 
advocated "get tough on crime" rhetoric, it is highly unlikely that 
legislatures will amend or repeal these statutes.270 Courts reviewing the 
cases of young offenders sentenced under punitive sentencing legisla-
tion have demonstrated an unwillingness to restrict the use of these 
sentencing statutes.271 
Appeals challenging the use of transfer legislation have not met 
with success. Fourteenth Amendment equal protection and due proc-
ess arguments against school and public housing zone legislative trans-
fer provisions have been unsuccessful.272 For example, in People v. M.A., 
a youth charged with unlawful use of a weapon on school grounds 
challenged the constitutionality of his transfer to criminal court under 
an Illinois school zone legislative transfer provision.273 
The Illinois Supreme Court rejected his equal protection argu-
ment that the weapon offense should remain within juvenile court 
jurisdiction.274 The court reasoned that juveniles are not a suspect class, 
and, therefore, the court was not required to apply a strict scrutiny test 
to the statute.275 Applying the less stringent rational basis standard, the 
court found that the legislature's statutory intent to deter youths from 
carrying weapons on school grounds was reasonable.276 The court 
found it irrelevant that the charged offense was similar to other of-
fenses within the scope of the juvenile court. 277 
268 See infra Part IV.B, notes 300-46 and accompanying text. 
269 See Cintron, supra note 14, at 1275. 
270 See generally Acton, supra note 54; see also REAL WAR ON CRIME, supra note 6, at 79-81, 
132-35. 
271 See, e.g., Harris v. Wright, 93 F.3d 581 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Johnson, 28 F.3d 
151 (D.C. Cir. 1994); United States v. Williams, 891 F.2d 212 (9th Cir. 1989); People v. R.L., 634 
N.E.2d 733 (Ill. 1994); People v. M.A., 529 N.E.2d 492 (Ill. 1988), cert. denied 115 S.Ct. 296 (1994). 
272 See R.L., 634 N.E.2d at 733; M.A., 529 N.E.2d at 492. 
275 529 N.E.2d at 492-93. 
274 See id. at 493-94. The trial court, finding no rational basis for the statutory provision, had 
held that the school zone transfer provision violated the youths' equal protection rights. See id. 
at 493. 
275 See id. at 494. 
276 See id. at 497. 
277 See id. at 493-94. 
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The court also rejected M.A.'s violation of due process argu-
ment. 278 The court held that the legislature's approach to achieving its 
goal of reducing violence in schools was rationa1. 279 Thus, the court 
reasoned, depriving a youth of his liberty for a longer period than that 
of a youth sentenced in juvenile court is not a violation of due proc-
ess. 280 
Similarly, the Illinois Supreme Court found no violation of equal 
protection in People v. R.L.28J In RL., two youths were transferred to 
criminal court under a legislative provision requiring the transfer of 
fifteen and sixteen-year-old youths charged with committing a drug 
offense within one thousand feet of a public housing structure.282 The 
court again refused to apply the strict scrutiny standard and found a 
rational basis for the creation of the transfer legislation.283 According 
to the Illinois Supreme Court, punishing fifteen and sixteen-year-olds 
is a reasonable means to deter narcotic activity in an area where the 
impact of narcotics has been severe.284 
Eighth Amendment proportionality challenges to severe senten-
ces imposed on transferred juveniles have also proven unsuccessfu1.285 
The United States Supreme Court has employed the Eighth Amend-
ment proportionality test to assess whether states may sentence youths 
to the death penalty.286 However, it has never granted certiorari to a 
noncapital young offender case in which the role of the proportionality 
test could be determined.287 Upholding a mandatory life imprisonment 
without possibility of parole sentence, the Ninth Circuit has held that 
youth has no bearing on the proportionality analysis of sentences for 
juveniles convicted of noncapital crimes.288 Thus, this court has held 
278 See M.A., 529 N.E.2d at 496-97. 
279 See id. 
280 See id. 
281 634 N.E.2d at 739. The trial court had held that the legislative public housing zone 
provision denied equal protection of the law because it had a disparate effect. See id. at 736. 
282 See id. at 735. 
283 See id. at 737, 739. 
284 See id. at 739. 
285 See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 997-1001 (1991); Harris v. Wright, 93 F.3d 
581 (9th Cir. 1996); People v. Laundsburry (CAI78536; 6/25/96) (cited in Department Michigan 
opinion Notes, 75 MICH. B. J. 1334, 1335. (1996)). The proportionality test requires courts to 
undertake a higher level of scrutiny to ensure that punishment is not "grossly disproportionate" 
to the crime it serves to punish. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 997-98, 1001. 
286 See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 
(1988); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982). 
287 See Harvard Law Review Case Comment, supra note 54, at 1185. 
288 See Hams, 93 F.3d at 585. Fifteen·year-old Harris and another juvenile committed a 
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that the Eighth Amendment does not limit the length of incarceration 
which may be imposed on a youth of any age.289 The Ninth Circuit 
restricted the "special mitigating force of youth,"290 recognized by the 
United States Supreme Court in Thompson v. Oklahoma, to capital 
punishment cases.291 
Fifth Amendment due process challenges to the federal sentenc-
ing guidelines provisions that enhance sentences based on juvenile 
adjudication records have also failed. In United States v. Williams, the 
Ninth Circuit held that a United States District Court judge properly 
used two prior juvenile delinquency adjudications to increase an adult 
offender's sentence by one year.292 
Williams contended that the United States Supreme Court's hold-
ing in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,293 which denied juveniles the right to 
a jury trial, applies exclusively to proceedings with treatment, not 
punishment, dispositions.294 With this foundation, he argued that using 
treatment-based juvenile court sentences, decided without the benefit 
of a jury, for purposes of punitive enhancement violates the Fifth 
Amendment due process clause.295 Williams asserted that the federal 
sentencing guidelines impermissively interpret juvenile court senten-
ces as indications of a need for an increased punitive response.296 
The Ninth Circuit rejected Williams' interpretation of McKeiver, 
reasoning that the McKeiver Court intended no such limitation on its 
denial of a constitutional right to a jury trial for youthS.297 The court 
noted that McKeiver requires "fundamental fairness" for youths and 
that the procedural safeguards Williams received, including counsel 
and the right to cross-examine, ensured that any deprivation of liberty 
robbery during which the other youth killed a store owner. See id. at 582. Under the felony-murder 
rule, Harris was transferred to criminal court on an aggravated first-degree murder charge. See 
id. He was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of parole. See id. 
289 See Harris, 93 F.3d at 585. 
~o Tlwmpson, 487 U.S. at 834. 
~1 See Harris, 93 F.3d at 584-85. 
~2891 F.2d at 215-16. Williams' two prior juvenile delinquency adjudications increased his 
criminal history score and the length of his sentence. See id. at 213. For other cases rejecting due 
process arguments on a rationale equating juvenile and criminal court proceedings see United 
States v. Booten, 914 F.2d 1352, 1354-55 (9th Cir. 1990), and United States v. Rangel-Navarro, 907 
F.2d 109, llO (9th Cir. 1990). 
~3 See 403 U.S. at 545, 551 (holding that juveniles are not constitutionally entitled to jury 
trials in juvenile court proceedings). 
~4 See Williams, 891 F.2d at 214. 
~5See id. 
~6See id. 
~7 See id. at 215. 
662 BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORW LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19:621 
ensuing from the adjudication was fundamentally fair and constitu-
tional.29B The court further reasoned that if it is not unconstitutional 
to deprive a youth of liberty without a jury trial, then it is not uncon-
stitutional to use that sentence to lengthen the offender's deprivation 
of liberty as an adult.299 
These failed constitutional claims demonstrate that the courts are 
unable or unwilling to limit the harsh effects of recent punitive sen-
tencing legislation on young offenders. The implication of these deci-
sions is that the juvenile justice system is rapidly becoming a system 
parallel in its punitive goals to that of the criminal justice system. 
B. Future Implications of Punitive Sentencing Trends 
Legislatures' aim to replicate the punitive trends of the criminal 
justice system in the juvenile court, despite the known flaws associated 
with these trends, has led to the ill-conceived, gradual chipping away 
of the juvenile justice system structure and purpose.300 These sentenc-
ing trends effectively convert the juvenile court's rehabilitative func-
tion into a punitive punishment function parallel to that of criminal 
courts.301 If such trends continue to impose punitive sentencing 
schemes on the juvenile court and remove young offenders from 
juvenile court jurisdiction, it is foreseeable that a rehabilitative court 
system for youths will cease to exist.1102 Some elected officials have 
already advocated dismantling the juvenile justice system entirely.3D3 
State legislation adopting this general shift in approach toward young 
offenders lacks a vision of the most appropriate response to juvenile 
crime and has negative ramifications for the safety of the general 
public. 
298 See id.; Dormont, supra note 151, at 1788-89; Mills, supra note 7, at 925. 
299 See WiUiams, 891 F.2d at 215; Dormont, supra note 151, at 1788-89 & 1789 n.l00. 
500 See D'Ambra, My Waiver is Not a Panacea, supra note 61,at 278; Fritsch & Hemmens, 
supra note 11, at 609; Cintron, supra note 14, at 1275. 
SOl See Baldi, supra note 56, at 592; Tompkins et al., supra note 55, at 1628, Mills, supra note 
7, at 935. 
502 See Cintron, supra note 14, at 1275; Kamenstein, supra note 175, at 2150. 
505For example, Los Angeles County District Attorney Gil Garcetti reportedly commented, 
"[ w 1 e need to throwaway our entire juvenile justice system." See Richard Lacayo, When Kids Go 
Bad; America :s Juvenile-Justice System is Antiquated, Inadequate and No Longer Able to Cope with the 
Violence Wrought by ChildTen that No One Would CaU Innocents, TIME, Sept. 19, 1994, at 60; see 
also Fritsch & Hemmens, supra note II, at 609 (reporting that Texas Governor George W. Bush 
relied heavily on "get tough with young offenders" rhetoric in his 1994 gubernatorial campaign). 
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1. Punitive Sentencing Legislation Prohibits Young Offenders from 
Receiving Rehabilitative Services Necessary to Change 
Inappropriate Behavior and Thinking 
Current punitive sentencing legislation denies access to rehabili-
tative services to large classes of youths based on the belief that the 
juvenile court is unable to effectively redress and reduce juvenile 
crime.304 Rejecting the rehabilitative juvenile justice system as a means 
of addressing juvenile crime, in exchange for a punitive adult criminal 
justice system uneducated to developmental differences between youth 
and adults, is unwise.s05 Rhode Island State Child Advocate Laureen 
D'Ambra argues, 
Abandoning the rehabilitative model for a punitive model is 
a weak attempt to abate the complex problem [of violent 
juvenile crime]. Youths are labeled adults and turned over to 
the adult system "not because the juveniles have reached a 
level of maturity consonant with adulthood but rather be-
cause society has given up on them. "306 
Abbe Smith, Deputy Director and Clinical Instructor of Harvard 
Law School's Criminal Justice Institute agrees.307 She writes, "[w]e 
call kids adults or criminals in order to throw them away. "308 
A separate juvenile system distinguishes youths from adults based 
on their cognitive developmental differences and, thus, the youths' 
amenability to rehabilitation. American criminal law jurisprudence 
dictates that the severity of punishment imposed correspond not only 
to the degree of harm inflicted, but also to the offender's blamewor-
thiness.30g Blameworthiness is assessed by cognitive development differ-
ences including the maturity of the offender and his/her mental and 
emotional state at the time of the offense.3JO As a result, cognitive 
!O4 See Dale, supra note 101, at 204; D'Ambra, Why Waiver is Not a Panacea, supra note 61, 
at 278-79; Smith, A., supra note 16, at 992-93. 
!O5 See D'Ambra, Waiver Statutes in Rhode Island, supra note 69, at 29; Smith, A., supra note 
16, at 964. 
506D'Ambra, Why Waiver is Not a Panacea, supra note 61, at 279 (quoting Catherine R. 
Guttman, Note, Listen to the Children: The Decision to Transfer Juveniles to Adult Court, 30 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 507, 509 (1995». 
!O7 See Smith, A., supra note 16, at 993. 
!Os Id. 
509 See Feld, Principle of the Offense, supra note 67, at 483; Streib, supra note 73, at 431. 
310 See Streib, supra note 73, at 431. 
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developmental differences distinguishing young offenders from their 
adult counterparts make youths less blameworthy for their offenses.311 
For example, youths are not as capable as adults at making good 
decisions and moral choices, which are learned behaviors.312 They 
exhibit less self-discipline and are more impulsive than adults.313 They 
are less able to appreciate the consequences of their acts than are 
adults.314 Furthermore, they are more easily coerced by peers and more 
susceptible to group process dynamics than adults.315 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that cognitive 
differences between adults and youths necessitate a different legal 
response. In its decision prohibiting execution of youths under the age 
of sixteen, the majority in Thompson v. Oklahoma reasoned that youths 
are less blameworthy than adults for their acts.316 The Court cited the 
cognitive differences of inexperience, less education, limited ability to 
evaluate the consequences of one's own conduct, and peer pressure as 
reasons a juvenile should not suffer the same penalty as an adult 
committing the same offense.317 Similarly, in Bellotti v. Baird, the Su-
preme Court recognized that states may limit the rights of juveniles 
because, unlike adults, youths lack the ability to make mature deci-
sions.318 
The juvenile justice system, in recognition of the cognitive devel-
opmental differences of youths, has traditionally treated young offend-
ers differently than adults are treated in criminal court.319 Criminal 
courts are most concerned with dispensing punishment in proportion 
to severity of offense.32o The juvenile court was created to focus less on 
punishing and more on rehabilitating youths to address and correct 
311 See DALE ET AL., supra note 12,'9.04 [3], at (9-26), (9-38); Feld, Principle of the Offense, 
supra note 67, at 524-26; see also Zimring, Kids, Groups and Crime, supra note 241, at 88~84. 
312 See DALE ET AL., supra note 12, '19.04 [3), at (9-26) to (9-27); Feld, Principle of the Offense, 
supra note 67, at 524-25; Smith, A. supra note 16, at 977. 
313 See Feld, Principle of the Offense, supra note 67, at 525. 
314 See DALE ET AL., supra note 12, 'I 9.04 [3], at (9-26) to (9-27); Feld, Principle of the Offense, 
supra note 67, at 524-26. 
m See Smith, A., supra note 16, at 966,980-83; Feld, Principle o/the Offense, supra note 67, 
at 526; Zimring, Kids, Groups and Crime, supra note 241, at 883. 
316 See 487 U.S. at 834-35, 838. 
m See id. at 835. 
318 See 443 u.S. 622, 635-36 (1979). U[M)inors often lack the experience, perspective, and 
judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be deuimental to them." Id. at 635. 
319 See id. at 635; DALE ET AL., supra note 12, '15.01 [4], at (5-7) to (5-8); Holden, supra 
note 71, at 844-45, 848, 853. 
320 See Feld, Principle of the Offense, supra note 67, at 484. 
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their inappropriate conduct. 321 Juvenile and criminal courts therefore 
traditionally focus on different concerns when determining an appro-
priate sentence for an offender.322 
As state statutes increasingly treat youths as adults, important 
cognitive developmental distinctions between the two groups of of-
fenders are obscured. This modern construction of youth assumes that 
the maturity and cognitive reasoning abilities of young offenders are 
equivalent to those of adult offenders.323 Judicial discretion to create 
individualized rehabilitative dispositions for each youth is diminished, 
and punitive sentences based on presumed culpability are imposed 
according to an objective assessment of the severity of the offense.324 
As a result, young offenders are denied the rehabilitative opportunities 
necessary to learn how to change their inappropriate behaviors and 
methods of thinking.325 
2. Sentencing Young Offenders Under Current Punitive Sentencing 
Legislation Threatens Public Safety 
In direct opposition to its intent, punitive sentencing legislation 
actually poses a threat to public safety. As discussed in Part III, Section 
B of this Note, research has demonstrated that young offenders sen-
tenced under punitive criminal justice statutes are more likely to re-
321 See DALE ET AL., supra note 12, , 5.01 (4), at (5-7) to (5-8) (stating that the intention of 
the juvenile justice system founders was to rehabilitate children before they became "career 
criminals"); Feld, Principle of the Offense, supra note 67, at 483-84 (reporting that the object of 
the juvenile court is to correct a condition through treatment of the youth); Holden, supra note 
71, at 848 (indicating that few juvenile court sanctions actually reflect the seriousness of the crimes 
committed) . 
322 See DALE ET AL., supra note 12, , 5.01 [4], at (5-7) to (5-8); Feld, Principle of the Offense, 
supra note 67, at 483-84; Holden, supra note 71, at 848. Juvenile court judges use extensive 
discretion to determine the appropriate individualized disposition for each young offender based 
on the offender's needs and history. See DALE ET AL., supra note 12, , 5.01 [4], at (5-8); Feld, 
Principle of the Offense, supra note 67, at 484-85; Holden, supra note 71, at 848. Unlike criminal 
court sentences, juvenile court sentences most often include curfews, treatment and educational 
programs, and/or a short period of confinement in a locked juvenile facility providing education 
and treatment to offenders. See Susan L. Freitas, Note, After Midnight: The Constitutional Status 
of Juvenile Curfw Ordinances in California, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 219, 244 (1996); Kara E. 
Nelson, Comment, The Release of Juvenile Records Under Wisconsin's Juvenile Justice Code: A Nw 
System of False Promises, 81 MARQ. L. REv. 1101, 1118-19 (1998); O'Connor & Treat, supra note 
55, at 1319. Furthermore, juvenile court proceedings are confidential to avoid stigmatizing the 
young offender which would hamper his or her opportunities to become a productive member 
of society. See generally Holden, supra note 71, at 844-45, 848; Nelson, supra, at 1118-19. 
323 See Baldi, supra note 56, at 592. 
324 See Feld, Principle of the Offense, supra note 67, at 472, 487, 519, 522. 
325 See O'Connor & Treat, supra note 55, at 1316-17. 
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cidivate than young offenders adjudicated delinquent in juvenile 
court. 326 The reasons underlying this finding are that criminal court 
sentences do not provide rehabilitative services to offenders, stigmatize 
youths with the pejorative label "criminal," and increase levels of juve-
nile violence.327 
Young offenders receiving criminal court sentences in adult cor-
rectional facilities are generally not provided with rehabilitative serv-
ices.!!28 The primary purpose of adult correctional facilities is retribu-
tion and incapacitation, not rehabilitation.329 Youths serving criminal 
court sentences are not afforded the counseling, educational, voca-
tional, or other services that juvenile court jurisdiction provides to 
young offenders adjudicated delinquent.33o 
In his Roberts v. State concurring opinion to remand the case of a 
convicted transferred youth to the trial court on procedural grounds, 
Florida Appellate Judge Winifred Sharp commented on the trial 
court's view of the juvenile justice system.!!!!) The trial court stated that 
adult sanctions are necessary for young offenders because the juvenile 
justice system is "bankrupt, broke, and [] doesn'twork."332Judge Sharp 
challenged the trial court's complaint regarding the inefficiency of the 
juvenile justice system, stating: 
Query whether the inadequacy of the juvenile justice system 
is an appropriate reason to impose adult sanctions on a four-
teen-year-old, and query whether society will be made safer 
by having Roberts locked up in an adult prison, only to be 
released, untreated and uncounseled, but older and wiser, in 
less than (probably) four years.333 
Judge Sharp's comments suggest that, despite frustration with the 
juvenile justice system, more thought should be devoted to deciding 
the most appropriate response to juvenile offending. Denying reha-
bilitative opportunities to young offenders decreases the likelihood 
526 See Bishop et al., supra note 244, at 182-83; O'Connor & Treat, supra note 55, at 1316--17. 
527 See Bishop et al., supra note 244, at 184-85; O'Connor & Treat, supra note 55, at 1316. 
528 See Cintron, supra note 14, at 1260; O'Connor & Treat, supra note 55, at 1316--17. 
529 See id.; Sheffer, supra note 11, at 502. 
550 See O'Connor & Treat, supra note 55, at 1316. 
M1 See 677 So. 2d I, 2-3 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (Sharp, J., concurring); Dale, supra note 
101, at 203~4. 
552 See Roberts, 677 So. 2d at 2 (Sharp, J. concurring, quoting the trial court); see also Dale, 
supra note 101, at 204. 
M5 Roberts, 677 So. 2d at 3; Dale, supra note 101, at 204. 
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of successful reintegration into a law-abiding community and, thus, 
increases the likelihood of re-offending.334 
Furthermore, by stigmatizing a youth with the pejorative label of 
"criminal," criminal court sentences condemn young offenders to the 
lack of societal opportunities a conviction offers.335 This label invokes 
condemnation from families, neighborhoods, and workplaces.336 Their 
distrustful, shaming attitude rejects convicted young offenders and 
excludes them from their communities.337 
Florida juvenile justice system researchers Donna Bishop, Charles 
Frazier, Lonn Lanza-Kaduce, and Lawrence Winner suggest, "[fJaced 
with that prospect [i.e., status transformation from 'redeemable youth' 
to 'unsalvageable adult'] ,338 youths may surrender self-restraint, accept 
the negative attributions of the culture that has excluded them, and 
seek out the companionship of others who tolerate or support contin-
ued deviation from societal norms. "339 In other words, young offenders 
labeled as criminals are likely to be rejected by law-abiding communi-
ties and accepted by other socially outcast offenders.34o In these circum-
stances, it is likely that they will continue to offend.341 
Finally, victimization of young offenders and their exposure to 
violence in adult correctional facilities increases the likelihood young 
offenders will re-offend in the community.342 It is well-established that 
a child's exposure to violence is highly correlated to his/her likelihood 
to later engage in violent conduct.343 In a 1989 study, approximately 
46% of youths in adult correctional facilities reported experiencing 
physical or sexual assault, more than half of the reported assaults 
involved a weapon. 344 In comparison, 37% of youths in locked juvenile 
facilities reported experiencing physical or sexual assault, less than 
10% of these assaults involved a weapon.345 In addition, the study 
revealed that sexual assault was five times less likely in juvenile than 
334 See Cintron, supra note 14, at 1275; O'Connor & Treat, supra note 55, at 1316; Sheffer, 
supra note 11, at 508. 
335 See Bishop et al., supra note 244, at 184. 
336 See id. 
337 See id. 
338Id. 
339Id. at 184-85. 
340 See Bishop et al., supra note 244, at 184-85. 
341 See id. 
342 See O'Connor & Treat, supra note 55, at 1316; Del Carlo, supra note 7, at 1244. 
343 See Smith, A., supra note 16, at 985; Del Carlo, supra note 7, at 1244. 
!!44 See O'Connor & Treat, supra note 55, at 1315; Del Carlo, supra note 7, at 1244. 
345 See id. 
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adult facilities, and staff members were less likely to beat youths in 
juvenile facilities. 346 Thus, to best protect public safety from repeated 
juvenile offending, young offenders should be sentenced in juvenile 
court and remain under juvenile court jurisdiction and in juvenile 
facilities (if such a measure is necessary) until they reach the age of 
majority. 
The continuing use of current punitive sentencing legislation 
suggests the gradual demise of a separate juvenile justice system. This 
must be prevented by rebuilding the juvenile court and granting it 
expanded sentencing powers to prevent the negative implications the 
legislation presents. To best ensure public safety, a healthy, fully func-
tioning juvenile court is essential. 
V. PROPOSED STRUCTURE OF THE JUVENILE COURT TO RETAIN 
REHABILITATIVE GOALS WHILE RECOGNIZING THE NEED TO PROTECT 
PUBLIC SAFETY 
The foregoing sections demonstrate that current punitive sentenc-
ing legislation is overly punitive and does not adequately protect public 
safety. State legislatures should not expose young offenders to the 
criminal court sentences that faulty criminal justice sentencing legisla-
tion demands (including mandatory minimum sentencing, sentence 
enhancements, and sentencing guidelines) .347 Nor should rpey create 
the equivalent of a criminal justice system for young offenders in the 
juvenile court by using punitive adult sanctions.348 Instead, more states 
should adopt blended sentencing legislation.349 This type of legislation 
enables young offenders to receive rehabilitative services while also 
answering the public demand for protection from young offenders.35o 
346 See O'Connor & Treat, supra note 55, at 1315-16; Del Carlo, supra note 7, at 1244. 
347 This is the effect of expanded transfer legislation and legislation reducing the maximum 
age of juvenile court jurisdiction. See supra Part Il.A, notes 67-89 and accompanying text. See, 
e.g., Margolis, supra note 197, at 381; Del Carlo, supra note 7, at 1231. 
348 This is the effect of legislation explicitly permitting juvenile courts to impose adult 
sanctions on young offenders. See supra Part II.B, notes 90-108 and accompanying text. See, e.g., 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1663(6) (Supp. 1997); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 119, § 58 (a) (West 
Supp. 1998); Smith, R., supra note 90, at 35. 
349 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 119, § 58 (West Supp. 1998); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 260.126(4) (West Supp. 1998); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.073(5) (West Supp. 1999); N.M. STAT. 
ANN. § 32A-2-20 (Michie 1995 & Supp. 1998). 
gso See Feld, A Case of Refurm, supra note 7, at 1038; Feld, Task Farce, supra note 61, at 21-22; 
Del Carlo, supra note 7, at 1246-47. 
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A. Blended Sentencing Approach 
Blended sentencing applies to only a limited class of youths.351 
Generally, juvenile court judges may impose blended sentences on 
youths aged fourteen to seventeen who are charged with a felony and 
have a previous felony delinquency adjudication or previous commit-
ment to state youth agency.352 Blended sentences generally include 
both a state youth facility sentence, potentially until the age of twenty-
one, and a suspended adult incarceration sentence.353 The suspended 
adult sentence is imposed only if the juvenile justice system fails in its 
efforts to rehabilitate a young offender during his/her time in youth 
facilities. 354 
Minnesota's blended sentencing statute presents a model which 
states should adopt. 355 Prior to imposing a blended sentence on a youth 
between the ages of fourteen and seventeen who is charged with a 
felony, a juvenile court judge holds a hearing to determine whether 
the youth poses a public safety threat.356 If the youth is found to pose 
a public safety threat, and is found to have committed the felony 
offense, then the judge imposes a blended sentence.357 Upon violation 
351 See Feld, A Case of &farm, supra note 7, at 1043-45, 1048-49; Feld, TaskForce, supra note 
61, at 23; see also MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 119, §§ 52, 58(c) (West Supp. 1998) (limiting blended 
sentencing to youths aged 14 to 17 who pose a present and long-term threat to public safety and 
who have a previous state youth agency commitment or whose offense involves infliction or threat 
of serious bodily harm or possession or distribution of unlawful firearms); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 260.126(1)-(2) (West Supp. 1998) (limiting blended sentencing to youths aged 14 to 17 
charged with a felony who also pose a threat to public safety). 
352 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 119, § 52 (West Supp. 1998); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 260.126(4) (West 1998). 
353 See &farm Proposals, supra note 115, at 35; Feld, A Case of &farm, supra note 7, at 1038; 
Feld, Task Force, supra note 61, at 22-23. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 119, § 58(b) (West 
Supp. 1998) (extending juvenile court jurisdiction for youths designated ''Youthful Offenders" to 
the age of21); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.126(4) (West 1998) (extendingjuveniIe court jurisdiction 
for youths designated "Extended Jurisdiction Juveniles" to the age of 21). 
354 See Feld, A Case of &farm, supra note 7, at 1042; Feld, Task Force, supra note 61, at 23. 
See also MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 119, § 58(b) (West Supp. 1998) (providing that suspended 
adult sentences shall only be imposed on youths who do not successfully complete the state youth 
facility commitment and a term of probation); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.126(5) (West 1998) 
(providing that suspended adult sentences may only be imposed on youths violating conditions 
of the stay or committing a new offense). 
355 See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.126(1)-(2) (West 1998); Feld, A Case of &farm, supra note 
7, at 1043-45; Feld, Task Force, supra note 61, at 22. 
356 See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.126(1)-(2) (West 1998); Feld, A Case of &farm, supra note 
7, at 1044. 
357 See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.126(4) (West 1998); Feld, A Case of &farm, supra note 7, at 
1048-49. 
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of a condition of the sentence (including any conditions placed on the 
youth by the state youth agency) or upon commission of a new offense, 
a juvenile court judge may, but is not required to, impose the sus-
pended adult sentence on the young offender.358 Successful completion 
of the state youth agency portion of the sentence releases the offender 
from the adult sentence.359 
States adopting blended sentencing legislation do not need any 
other punitive sentencing legislation such as transfer statutes or legis-
lation reducing the maximum age of juvenile court jurisdiction. A 
juvenile court judge can impose a punitive suspended adult sentence 
on any young offender aged fourteen or older who commits a violent 
offense. 36o The youth must be provided an opportunity to rehabilitate 
him/herself; however, if the judge determines that the youth is not 
making an attempt, as evidenced by failure to comply with the sentence 
or state youth agency conditions, the judge can impose the adult 
sentence at any time.361 This serves the same intended incapacitation, 
retributive, and deterrent purposes of other punitive sentencing legis-
lation.362 
B. The Benefits of the Blended Sentencing Approach 
There are several reasons why blended sentencing schemes pro-
vide the best approach toward sentencing young offenders. Blended 
sentencing schemes do not overpenalize youths, they ensure that more 
youths are afforded rehabilitation opportunities, and they offer public 
protection by more effectively rehabilitating youths so that they are less 
likely to re-offend.363 ! 
Blended sentencing legislation does not overpenalize young of-
fenders because it requires an assessment of the need for adult or 
juvenile sanctions based on the young offender's rehabilitation success, 
g58 See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.126(5) (West 1998); Feld, A Case oj ReJorm, supra note 7, at 
1048-49. The rationale underlying the legislature's decision not to require ajuvenile court judge 
to impose a suspended adult sentence on a young offender for violation of a sentence condition 
is that the legislature did not want a large number of youths to receive adult sanctions through 
summary probation revocation hearings. See Feld, A Case oj ReJorm, supra note 7, at at 1050. 
g59 See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.126(4)(2) (West 1998). 
g60 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 119, §§ 52, 58(b) (West Supp. 1998); MINN. STAT. 
ANN. § 260.126(1) (West 1998). 
g61 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 119, § 58(b) (West Supp. 1998); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 260.126(5) (West 1998). 
g62 See, e.g., Hatch, supra note 9, at 188; Heglin, supra note 7, at 217-19. 
g63 See Blegen, supra at note 11, at 51; Feld, A Case oj ReJorm, supra note 7, at 1246; Del Carlo, 
supra note 7, at 1246. 
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not based on the offense, the arbitrary distinction which transfer stat-
utes make.364 Blended sentencing legislation recognizes the poor appli-
cability of a bright-line test to distinguish adults from juveniles. 365 Tra-
ditionally, the test was an arbitrary age difference.366 Depending upon 
the state, when youths reached the age of seventeen or eighteen, they 
became adults with the attainment of the requisite birthday.367 Juvenile 
transfer legislation has altered the test to determine when a youth 
becomes an adult as measured by the offense charge leveled against 
the youth.368 
In contrast, blended sentencing legislation suggests that the de-
termination of when a youth becomes an adult varies between offend-
ers based on individual characteristics such as level of cognitive devel-
opment and maturity.369 Some young offenders may need, and benefit 
from, rehabilitative services available through the juvenile justice sys-
tem.370 Others may already display the maturity and developmental 
rigidity of an adult.371 As Minnesota considered adopting blended sen-
tencing legislation as a response to juvenile crime, 1992-94 Minnesota 
Juvenile Justice Task Force committee chair Barry C. Feld observed: 
The Task Force recognized that one fundamental deficiency 
of all [transfer] legislation is its binary quality, either juvenile 
or adult, even though adolescence is a developmental contin-
uum requiring a continuum of controls. To avoid recreating 
a false dichotomy, the Task Force recommended, "a more 
graduated juvenile justice system that establishes a new tran-
sitional component between the juvenile and adult systems 
"372 
Thus, blended sentencing schemes offer rehabilitation with a puni-
tive provision attached should rehabilitation fail. 373 That is, through 
g64 See Feld, Principle of the Offense, supra note 67, at 494; Del Carlo, supra note 7, at 1247. 
See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 119, § 58 (b) (West Supp. 1998); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 260.126(4)(a)(2) (West 1998). 
g65 See Smith, A., supra note 16, at 1019-21. 
g66 See id. at 1019; Baldi. supra note 56. at 592. 
g67 See Smith, A .• supra note 16. at 1019. 
368 See id. at 1020. 
g69 See Feld. Task Farce, supra note 61. at 22. 
g70 See Feld, A Case of Refurm, supra note 7. at 1034-35. 
371 See id. 
m See id. at 1038 (emphasis in original); see also Feld, Task Farce, supra note 61. at 22. 
m See Blegen, supra note 11. at 48; Feld. A Case of Refurm, supra note 7. at 1041-42; Del 
Carlo. supra note 7. at 1246. 
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a blended sentence, a young offender receives rehabilitative services 
through the state youth agency, but if the youth is unsuccessful in 
his/her rehabilitation attempts, the youth is sent to prison.374 
Blended sentencing legislation does not overpenalize young of-
fenders for a second reason-juvenile court judicial discretion. 
Blended sentencing schemes supply juvenile court judges with the 
discretion that other sentencing legislation denies them.375 Under a 
blended sentencing scheme, a juvenile court judge may select the 
length and nature of the sentence he/she imposes.376 The judge also 
has complete discretion as to when and whether to impose the sus-
pended adult sentence.377 Similarly, discretion as to when a young 
offender has been sufficiently rehabilitated to return him to the com-
munity lies with the experienced juvenile court judge. 378 Traditionally, 
juvenile court judges committing young offenders to a state youth 
authority had little control over the actual length of a youth's disposi-
tion.379 They played no role in determining when to return the youth 
to the community.380 
Judicial discretion prevents overpenalization because it is not ex-
ercised indiscriminately over classes of youthS.381 The exercise of dis-
374 See id. 
375See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 58 (b) (West Supp. 1998); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 260.126(4) (a) (2) (West 1998); Blegen, supra note 11, at 48; Del CaTlo, supra note 7, at 1246-47. 
376 See id. 
377 See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.126(5) (West 1998); Blegen, supra note 11, at 48; Feld, A Case 
of Reform, supra note 7, at 1048-49; Del CaTlo, supra note 7, at 1246. 
378 See Blegen, supra note 11, at 48; Del CaTlo, supra note 7, at 1247. 
379 See Blegen, supra note 11, at 49 (discussing new Missouri provision granting juvenile court 
authority to set a minimum period of youth agency custody); Feld, A Case of Reform, supra note 
7, at 1083-84 (contrasting the traditional approach with a 1980 determinate sentencing plan in 
Minnesota); PassaTelli, supra note 10, at 576, 585 (explaining the authority vested in the Massa-
chusetts DepaTtment of Youth Services to control sentence duration determinations for youths 
not sentenced under the blended sentencing statute). The reasoning for this approach is the 
idea that youth authority employees working with a young offender aTe in a better position to 
determine when a youth has sufficiently benefitted from rehabilitative services to justify the 
offender's return to the community. See Feld, A Case of Reform, supra note 7, at 1083-84; PassaTelli, 
supra note 10, at 583-84, 584 n.66. 
380 See Feld, A Case of Reform, supra note 7, at 1083; PassaTelli, supra note 10, at 584--85. 
Recent legislation enacted in Missouri removes this decision from the state youth agency and 
returns it to juvenile court judges. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.181(4) (West 1996 & Supp. 1999); 
Blegen, supra note 11, at 49. The Missouri statute enables a juvenile court judge to impose a 
determinate sentence of commitment to the state youth agency. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.181 (4) 
(West 1996 & Supp. 1999); Blegen, supra note 11, at 49. The youth may not be released from 
this sentence until the commitment period set by the judge expires or the state agency with 
custody of the youth petitions the court. See id. . 
381 See Baldi, supra note 56, at 589; Holden, supra note 71, at 848. 
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cretion is based on individual offender characteristics, including the 
offender's rehabilitation success.382 In other words, juvenile court 
judges are unlikely to release young offenders from their suspended 
adult sentences until they demonstrate that they have utilized and 
improved their behaviors and thinking through rehabilitative serv-
ices.383 
Blended sentencing legislation ensures that rehabilitative services 
are provided to young offenders. Unlike other punitive sentencing 
legislation, young offenders receiving a blended sentence are offered 
an opportunity to rehabilitate themselves in the juvenile justice sys-
tem.384 It is the last opportunity the juvenile justice system has to 
change a youth's inappropriate behaviors and thinking.385 The length 
of juvenile court jurisdiction is extended to twenty-one to provide time 
to accomplish this change.s8s Furthermore, young offenders who do 
not fit the blended sentence offender classification (or other legislative 
transfer criteria) are ensured that they will receive a juvenile court 
sentence, which provides rehabilitative services.s87 
Finally, blended sentencing legislation offers public safety protec-
tion in two primary ways. First, blended sentences have the potential 
to more effectively rehabilitate youths so that they are less likely to 
re-offend.3ss Blended sentences not only ensure that youths have the 
opportunity to rehabilitate themselves, but also impose a suspended 
adult sentence on youths as an additional incentive to succeed.ss9 Using 
both a carrot and a stick encourages more youths to actively engage in 
rehabilitative services.s9o Second, a sentence involving adult incarcera-
tion of a set time period is meted out only on those young offenders 
most likely to pose a threat to public safety.391 
582 See Barry C. Feld, The [Ugh! to Counsel in Juvenile Court: An Empirical Study of When 
Lawyers Appear and the Difference They Make, 79 J. CRIM. L. Be CRIMINOLOGY 1185, 1339 (1989) 
[hereinafter Feld, Right to Counsel); Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of the 
Offense: Punishment, Treatment, and the Difference it Makes, 68 B.U. L. REv. 821, 896 (1988) 
[hereinafter Feld, Punishment, Treatment, and the Difference); Baldi, supra note 56, at 589. 
58S See Fritsch Be Hemmens, supra note II, at 604. 
584 See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.126(4) (2) (West 1998); Feld, A Case of Refurm, supra note 7, 
at 1038; Feld, Task Force, supra note 61, at 22; Del Carlo, supra note 7, at 1246. 
585 See Feld, A Case of Refurm, supra note 7, at 1038; Feld, Task Force, supra note 61, at 22. 
S86 See Feld, A Case of Refurm, supra note 7, at 1047; Feld, Task Force, supra note 61, at 23. 
587 See Feld, A Case of Refurm, supra note 7, at 1044. 
588 See Del Carlo, supra note 7, at 1246. 
S89 See Feld, A Case of Refurm, supra note 7, at 1038; Feld, Task Force, supra note 61, at 22; 
Del Carlo, supra note 7, at 1246-47. 
390 See id. 
m See Del Carlo, supra note 7, at 1247. 
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Imposing a blended sentence assures the public that the youths 
most likely to re-offend are incarcerated and kept away from the com-
munity.392 Young offenders who are unsuccessful in effectively utilizing 
rehabilitative services receive the punitive adult sentence previously 
suspended by the juvenile court judge. 393 
C. The Appropriate Manner in Mich to Impkment the Blended 
Sentencing Approach in a Model Juvenile Court 
To further ensure that sentences are appropriate, and to insulate 
the system from public and political pressure based on the fear of 
young offenders, legislatures must write five additional requirements 
into blended sentencing legislation. First, specialization of the juvenile 
court is essential so that no judge may rotate through the juvenile court 
as one of many court assignments. Second, all juvenile court judges 
must receive extensive training on cognitive development and its rela-
tionship tojuvenile offending. Third, to become ajuvenile court judge, 
all candidates must exhibit a background demonstrating experience 
in, or exposure to, both pro-prosecution and pro-defense ideology. 
Fourth, blended sentencing legislation must afford young offenders 
the same procedural safeguards adult offenders receive. Finally, all 
juvenile court judges must be appointed, not elected. 
1. Juvenile Court Specialization 
Specializing the juvenile court, as Massachusetts and Minnesota 
have done, ensures that juvenile court judges are best able to deter-
mine the appropriate sentence for a young offender.394 Furthermore, 
it insulates the juvenile justice system from serving as the de facto 
designated place for inexperienced, newly appointed district court 
judges to begin their judicial careers.395 Special training ensures devo-
!!I2 See id. 
!!IS See Feld, A Case of Refurm, supra note 7, at 1042; Blegen, supra note II, at 48; Del Carlo, 
supra note 7, at 1247. 
394 See MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 218, § 58 (West Supp. 1997) (discussing distribution of 
specialized juvenile court judges throughout Massachusetts counties); Daniel Golden, The Fates 
of Families: As the State Fails to Cope With Troubled Families, Responsibility is Falling to the Juvenile 
Courts. Activist Judges are Filling the Vacuum, Expanding Their Roles to Become Resoura-Brokers, 
Catalysts, and Advocates, BOSTON GLOBE, June 3, 1990 (Magazine), at 17; David L. Vas, Should 
Massachusetts Trial Judges Be Specialists? Some in Bar Advocate Civil/Criminal split, MASS. LAw. 
WKLY.,]uly 8,1996, at Section A. 
!!I5 See Golden, supra note 394. 
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tion to family law and the juvenile justice field. 396 An exclusive focus 
on juvenile law provides expertise in the field based on the judges' 
additional knowledge of the subject and experiences on the bench.397 
Specialized juvenile court judges can monitor the individual 
youths visiting their courtrooms.3gB They can best assess re-offending 
rates and any escalation in the type of offending.399 They can measure 
the success of rehabilitation programs in reducing or preventing re-of-
fending. 40o These judges are aware of the rehabilitative programs in the 
community, and can ensure that youths receive and attend programs.401 
As a result, specialized juvenile court judges are in the best position to 
be aware of which youths pose the greatest danger to public safety.402 
2. Training for Juvenile Court Judges 
Requiring juvenile court judges to receive extensive trammg on 
the developmental nature of adolescence aids the judges in assessing 
which young offenders pose a threat to the public and, consequently, 
should receive blended sentences.403 It also suggests that the judges will 
be able to apply their knowledge to implement the most effective and 
appropriate sentencing approaches to curb other forms of juvenile 
offending.404 
An offender's criminal liability for an offense and, thus, the ap-
propriate corresponding punishment, is traditionally premised on the 
seriousness of the offense.405 Seriousness of the offense is measured by 
considering the harm caused and the offender's culpability.406 Of-
fender culpability is the blameworthiness of the offender's choice to 
engage in the conduct that caused harm.407 Assuming arguendo that a 
~96 See id. 
~97 See Marshall H. Tanick, Creation of 'Business Court' is Long Overdue in Minnesota: SPeciali-
zation Could Let System Use Expertise to Provide Fair, Faster Decisions, STAR-nuB. (Mpls.-St. Paul, 
MN), Feb. 3, 1997, at 3D; Golden, supra note 394; Yas, supra note 394. 
~98 See Golden, supra note 394. 
~99 See id. 
owo See id. 
oWl See id. 
oW2 See id. 
oW3 See Feld, Punishment, Treatment, and the Difference, supra note 382, at 900; Susan Koenig-
Cramer, Editorial, 'System Should Be Revisited' Judge Selection Pre-Determined,' OMAHA WORLD-
HERALD, Apr. 17, 1993, at 13. 
oW4 See Feld, Punishment, Treatment, and the Difference, supra note 382, at 898. 
oW5 See id. 
oW6 See id. 
oW7 See id. 
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youth and adult can inflict the same harm, the two types of offenders 
differ dramatically in their culpability due to their developmental dif-
ferences.408 Youths are less able to forin moral judgments, less capable 
of controlling impulses, less aware of the consequences of their acts, 
and more vulnerable to peer group influence and group process dy-
namics.409 
Laws have historically demonstrated a different approach to 
youthS.4IO As previously mentioned, the majority of the United States 
Supreme Court in Thompson v. Oklahoma reasoned that youths are less 
blameworthy for their acts than adults.411 The Court cited the cognitive 
differences of inexperience, less education, limited ability to evaluate 
the consequences of his/her conduct, and peer pressure as reasons a 
youth should not suffer the same penalty as an adult committing the 
same offense.412 Similarly, in Bellotti v. Baird, the Supreme Court rec-
ognized that states may limit the rights of youths because, unlike adults, 
youths lack the ability to make mature decisions.413 
As a result, juvenile court judges must be able to understand the 
development stage of a young offender and his/her level of involve-
ment in the offense to identify the appropriate sentence and needed 
services.414 Punishing a youth beyond his/her level of culpability is an 
ineffective, unconstitutional method of attempting to curb the of-
fender's likelihood of re-offending and is unlikely to deter or prevent 
others from committing similar offenses.415 
3. Background Requirements for Juvenile Court Judicial Candidates 
Requiring a blended prosecution and defense background of ju-
venile court judges may reduce slanted sentencing views and ensures 
experience in approaching and addressing young offenders and their 
offenses.416 A judge without such a balanced background may believe 
408 See id. at 898-900; Sheffer, supra note II, at 509. 
409 See Feld, Punishment, Treatment, and the Difference, supra note 382, at 911; Zimring, Defense 
of Discretionary Waiver, supra note 58, at 279. 
410 See Feld, Punishment, Treatment, and the Difference, supra note 382, at 901; Sheffer, supra 
note 11, at 509. 
411487 U.S. 815 at 834-35. 
412 See id. 
m See 433 U.S. at 635-36. 
414 See Feld, Punishment, Treatment, and the Difference, supra note 382, at 900-01. 
415 See id. 
416 See Steve Alumbaugh & C.K. Rowland, The Links Between Platform-Based Appointment 
Criteria and TrialJudges' AburtionJudgments, 74 JUDICATURE 153, 153-56, 162 (1990); if. Tripp 
Baltz, Juvenile Court's Trail of Broken Dreams, CHICAGO LAw., Oct. 1991, at 1 (quoting Cook 
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that he/she must continue to evince a pro-prosecution, pro-defense, 
or other perspective because that was a factor in his/her appoint-
ment.417 Furthermore, a judge may be less familiar with the appropriate 
punishment justifications for a particular sentencing approach.418 With-
out experience in, or exposure to, both approaches, a judge could be 
more likely to sentence in accordance to the view with which he/she 
is most familiar, or in accordance with his/her personal views.419 
In addition, requiring a balanced criminal law background aids in 
insulating the juvenile justice system from political appointments .to 
the bench for reasons other than expertise and experience in the 
field.420 As Betty Jo Anthony, a Roanoke County prosecutor and Presi-
dent of the Virginia Women Attorneys Association comments, "I think 
there's very little of that [personal qualification] scrutiny of the candi-
dates now; so what you have is that [selection of judicial candidates to 
present to the Governor] turns into a popularity contest. "421 
4. Due Process Procedural Safeguards 
To prevent unconstitutional infringement on the liberty interests 
of young offenders, juvenile courts must provide youths facing a 
County, Illinois Public Guardian and chief supervisor for juvenile court guardians ad litem Patrick 
Murphy and others in the field for their views on the juvenile justice system); Vas, supra note 394 
(discussing the need for juvenile court specialization to ensure experience on the bench). 
417 See Alumbaugh & Rowland, supra note 416, at 153-56, 162; if. Laurence Hammack, Do 
We Get the Most QJlalified Judges, or Most Liked?, ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD NEWS (Roanoke, 
Virg.) ,July 3,1994, atA1 (discussing that factors such as political alliances and church affiliation 
often playa role in judicial appointment decisions) ; Koenig-Cramer, supra note 403 (arguing that 
the juvenile court is "unique," and its judicial selection process requires more than the traditional 
"too political" approach that sends the loud message: "Those without buddies on the [governor's 
judicial nominating] commission need not apply"). 
418 See Hammack, supra note 417. 
419 See id.; Alumbaugh & Rowland, supra note 416, at 153-54, 156, 162. 
420 See Alumbaugh & Rowland, supra note 416, at 153-56, 162; Hammack, supra note 417; 
Baltz, supra note 416; Koenig-Cramer, supra note 403. 
Old friendships can be just as powerful as political unions; some lawyers say privately 
that where a candidate went to college or which church he or she attends can carry 
as much or more weight than trial experience or legal expertise. None of the 265 
lawyers [in Roanoke, Roanoke County, and Salem, Virginia] who responded to the 
[Center for Community Research at Roanoke College] survey thought that 
qualifications, trial experience or legal knowledge were the only issues considered 
by legislatures. Fifty-seven percent said somewhat and 13% said "not at all." 
Hammack, supra note 417. Hammack further reports that one lawyer in the study stated that the 
biggest problem with the judicial appointment process is that it discourages highly qualified 
candidates from seeking a judgeship. See id. 
421 See id. 
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blended sentence with all procedural safeguards available to adults. 
Blended sentencing permits juvenile court judges to impose on a 
young offender a suspended sentence of the same severity an adult 
might receive.422 The judge can lift the stay and require the youth to 
serve the full sentence at the judge's discretion.423 It appears to be a 
due process violation to sentence a youth to the same severity of 
punishment as an adult offender without providing him/her with 
equivalent procedural safeguards.424 
The Supreme Court already provides youths with several proce-
dural rights afforded adults including: right to notice of charges, right 
to counsel, right to cross-examine, right against self-incrimination, 
right to appeal, right to a record of proceedings, protection against 
double jeopardy, and proof beyond a reasonable doubt burden of 
persuasion on the prosecution.425 However, youths sentenced in juve-
nile court are not entitled to all the same procedural safeguards as 
adults.426 It is essential that they receive the same safeguards, and many 
states enacting blended sentencing legislation have extended the right 
to a jury trial to juveniles in recognition of this fact. 427 Legal scholars 
argue that states should extend the right to bail on the same grounds.428 
422 See supra Part II.C, notes 109--24 and accompanying text. 
425 See supra Part II.C, notes 109--24 and accompanying text. 
424 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Dawson, supra note 7, at 969, 990-91. 
425 See, e.g., Breed v.Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975) (protection against double jeopardy); In re 
Winship, 397 U.S. 357 (1970) (proof beyond a reasonable doubt); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) 
(right to notice, record of the proceedings, counsel, cross-examination, not to incriminate self); 
Kent v. U.S., 383 U.S. 541 (1966) (right to waiver hearing, right to reasons for transfer, right to 
appeal). 
426 See supra Part I1I.A.1 (c), notes 182-96 and accompanying text; Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 
253 (1984) (affirming statute authorizing pretrial detention of youths if there is a "serious risk" 
that the youth will commit a subsequent offense before the trial date. The Court reasoned that 
youths are always under some form of custody and the harm to the community threatened by a 
young offender may be greater than an adult offender because of the high rate of recidivism 
among juveniles.); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (holding that youths are not 
constitutionally entitled to jury trials in juvenile proceedings because the rehabilitative nature of 
the juvenile court is different from the nature of adult proceedings); Smith, A., supra note 16, 
at 1022. 
427 See MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 119, § 55A (West Supp. 1998); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 260.126(3) (West 1998); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-2-16 (Michie 1995); cJ. McKeiver, 403 U.S. 528 
(holding that youths are not constitutionally entitled to ajury trial in juvenile court proceedings). 
428 See generaUy Baldi, supra note 56; cJ. Schal~ 467 U.S. 253 (holding that juveniles are not 
constitutionally entitled to bail prior to juvenile adjudication proceedings). 
1999] JUVENILE SENTENCING 679 
5. Judicial Independence Free from Public Influence 
Finally, appointing judges to the juvenile court frees them from 
dependence on the public for the future of their careers.429 As a result, 
they are less likely than elected judges to succumb to the pressure of 
popular opinion in sentencing young offenders.43o 
It is especially important for juvenile court judges to work inde-
pendently of public pressure because public sentencing demands are 
focused on revenge and protection of public safety to the exclusion of 
offender culpability, which varies across young offenders, especially by 
level of development.431 Public demands for a punitive response to 
juvenile offending are often based on fear-invoking media attention 
devoted to violent juvenile crime, rather than an accurate picture of 
the threat to the public that young offenders actually pose.432 Media-fed 
punitive public demands, combined with those of politically motivated 
prosecutors and harsh sentencing statutes, already place great pressure 
on judges to severely sentence offenders. Given the already strong 
societal pressures, ajuvenile court judge's own desire for re-election is 
an unnecessary added incentive to encourage a judge to impose a se-
vere sanction on a young offender.433 Reflecting on political "get tough" 
rhetoric, University of Richmond School of Law Professor Robert E. 
Shepherd, Jr. warns that, "sound bites do not equal sound policy."434 
With these protections in place, the public can trust juvenile court 
judges to make the most appropriate sentencing decisions. Further-
more, state legislatures can then more confidently permit juvenile 
429 See Ed Godfrey, Some Fear Justice fur Sale: Judges at Center of Campaign Donatiuns Debate, 
DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Aug. 9, 1998, at 1; Hammack, supra note 417. In 1994,21 states required 
candidates for judicial positions to campaign for election to the bench. See Hammack, supra note 
417. 
430 See Godfrey, supra note 429; Hammack, supra note 417. However, as of 1998, 34 states 
require retention elections for appointed judges after a period of service on the bench, thus 
reducing their freedom from public opinion. See Larry T. Aspin & William K. Hall, Retention 
Electiuns andJudicial Behavior, 77 JUDICATURE 306, 312 (1994); Godfrey, supra note 429. 
431 See Smith, A., supra note 16, at 1005-06; Streib, supra note 73, at 429-31; Del Carlo, supra 
note 7, at 1249. See also supra Part IV.B.2, notes 326-34 and accompanying text. 
432 See D'Ambra, 'Why Waiver is Not a Panacea, supra note 61, at 277; O'Connor & Treat, 
supra note 55, at 1311; Smith, A., supra note 16, at 957-58,981 & 957 n.9. 
433 See Feld, A Case of Reform, supra note 7, at 966, 1087; Smith, A., supra note 16, at 989 & 
990 n.135; Hammack, supra note 417. In her article, Harvard Law School Clinical Instructor Abbe 
Smith discusses the dissatisfaction of former Philadelphia trial court judge Lois Forer with the 
criminal justice system. See Smith, A., supra note 16, at 990 n.135.Judge Forer chose not to impose 
a mandatory five year sentence on "an unemployed first-time offender who committed a toy-gun 
robbery for $50 out of desperation," but left the bench instead. See id. 
434 See Shepherd, 'What Does the Public &aUy Want, supra note 152, at 52. 
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court judges to exercise discretion in sentencing and should pass 
legislation granting juvenile court judges a vast array of sentencing 
powers. 
The trust and confidence in juvenile court judges by the state 
legislature is evidenced in Minnesota's blended sentencing statute.435 
Minnesota juvenile court judges are permitted to exercise case-by-case 
discretion in sentencing young offenders.436 Furthermore, they are 
permitted discretion to determine whether the violation of a blended 
sentence condition or the commission of a new offense should invoke 
the suspended adult sentence.437 As discussed, there is no automatic 
imposition of the suspended sentence.438 
CONCLUSION 
Most current punitive sentencing trends are ineffective and inap-
propriate. They do not ensure adequate public safety protection, and 
they overpenalize young offenders. The haphazard adoption of several 
types of criminal and juvenile justice sentencing legislation has had an 
exceptionally punitive effect on young offenders. Legislation sentenc-
ing young offenders based solely on age (e.g., legislation lowering the 
maximum age of juvenile jurisdiction) or solely on offense (e.g., some 
forms of transfer), uses an inappropriate blanket approach toward 
classes of young offenders. It is likely that many of these youths could 
benefit from rehabilitative services if provided the opportunity. Simi-
larly, indiscriminately granting criminal court sentencing powers to 
juvenile court judges could encourage these judges to overlook impor-
tant cognitive development and maturity distinctions of young offend-
ers. These distinctions may indicate that a youth can be rehabilitated 
if provided the opportunity, and not warehoused in adult facilities. 
Blended sentencing legislation schemes offer the most promising 
approach to resolving any threat juvenile offending poses to the public. 
Blended sentencing provides rehabilitation opportunities and services 
to those offenders able to utilize them to successfully return to their 
communities. Furthermore, blended sentencing prevents other offen-
ders from re-offending by placing them in prison. Either way, the 
public is protected from repeat offending. However, recognizing the 
455 See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.126 (West 1998); see also Feld, A Case of Refurm, supra note 
7, at 1038, 1042. 
456 See Del Carlo, supra note 7, at 1246; see also Ludwig, supra note 55, at 18. 
437 See Feld, A Case of Refunn, supra note 7, at 1042; Del Carlo, supra note 7, at 1246. 
438 See id. 
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importance of successful rehabilitation, the onus is on juvenile court 
judges and juvenile justice system personnel to aggressively examine 
and create ways in which the more violent young offenders can be 
rehabilitated in the juvenile justice system. As Federal Circuit Judge 
Skelly Wright warned more than twenty-five years ago in his United 
States v. Bland dissenting opinion: 
[T] here is no denying the fact that we cannot write these 
children off forever. Some day they will grow up and at some 
point they will have to be freed from incarceration .... 
[A]nd the kind of society we have in the years to come will 
in no small measure depend upon our treatment of them 
now.439 
To minimize juvenile offending, the solution remains granting 
sentencing discretion to juvenile court judges. Exercising this discre-
tion in the most appropriate manner requires specialization of the 
juvenile court and its judges, including extensive training on juvenile 
cognitive development and its relationship to offending. Furthermore, 
a system of judicial appointment, and a required judicial background 
including both pro-prosecution and pro-defense ideology are essential. 
A unified legislative approach entrusting juvenile court judges to sen-
tence appropriately ensures the best opportunities for young offenders 
and the best protection of public safety. 
439 472 F.2d 1329, 1349 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Wright, j., dissenting), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 909 
(1973); see also Acton, supra note 54, at 292 (discussing Justice Skelly Wright's dissent); Del Carlo, 
supra note 7, at 1251. 

